Consciousness and Cognition. The Cognitive Phenomenology Debate
According to a position which has dominated the theoretical landscape in the philosophy of mind until recently, only sensory states exhibit a characteristic phenomenal dimension, whereas cognitive states either utterly lack it, or inherit it from some of their accompanying sensory states. This posi...
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Auteurs principaux: | Elisabetta Sacchi, Alberto Voltolini |
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Format: | article |
Langue: | EN FR IT |
Publié: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2017
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Sujets: | |
Accès en ligne: | https://doaj.org/article/5ab29c63ffd24a50bfd254410cfe21d5 |
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