Perceiving subject and social cognition. Remarks from Adolf Reinach, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi

This paper deals with what Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi call “the social cognition” from the chapter How we know others in their book The Phenomenological Mind (Gallagher, Zahavi 2008), and what Adolf Reinach calls the “extraneous perception” in his university course Einleitung in die Philosophie...

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Autor principal:	Marco Tedeschini
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	phenomenology philosophy of mind intersubjectivity Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/5bb8f23caeeb4b5bb31faa228f8338e4
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:5bb8f23caeeb4b5bb31faa228f8338e42021-12-02T10:31:06ZPerceiving subject and social cognition. Remarks from Adolf Reinach, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi10.13128/Phe_Mi-196572280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/5bb8f23caeeb4b5bb31faa228f8338e42016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7065https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 This paper deals with what Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi call “the social cognition” from the chapter How we know others in their book The Phenomenological Mind (Gallagher, Zahavi 2008), and what Adolf Reinach calls the “extraneous perception” in his university course Einleitung in die Philosophie (Reinach 1913) – that is, the possibility of intersubjectivity, according to these authors. My objective is to show how Gallagher and Zahavi’s analyses could profit from that of Reinach. I find that Reinach’s study could provide a particular heuristic value to Gallagher and Zahavi’s work, by furnishing it with a useful tool to clear up some issues which, in my opinion, remain rather vague. The first part of this article is devoted to outlining Gallagher and Zahavi’s thesis about how we know others, clarifying which points of their analyses could be cleared up by Reinach’s study; the second part presents Reinach’s arguments concerning the perception of the other subject; and finally, I will explain how Reinach’s analysis contributes to that of Gallagher and Zahavi’s work and remark on what accessing to others’ mental state from the second-person perspective by combining the two positions means. Marco TedeschiniRosenberg & Sellierarticlephenomenologyphilosophy of mindintersubjectivityAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 1 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	phenomenology philosophy of mind intersubjectivity Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	phenomenology philosophy of mind intersubjectivity Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Marco Tedeschini Perceiving subject and social cognition. Remarks from Adolf Reinach, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi
description	This paper deals with what Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi call “the social cognition” from the chapter How we know others in their book The Phenomenological Mind (Gallagher, Zahavi 2008), and what Adolf Reinach calls the “extraneous perception” in his university course Einleitung in die Philosophie (Reinach 1913) – that is, the possibility of intersubjectivity, according to these authors. My objective is to show how Gallagher and Zahavi’s analyses could profit from that of Reinach. I find that Reinach’s study could provide a particular heuristic value to Gallagher and Zahavi’s work, by furnishing it with a useful tool to clear up some issues which, in my opinion, remain rather vague. The first part of this article is devoted to outlining Gallagher and Zahavi’s thesis about how we know others, clarifying which points of their analyses could be cleared up by Reinach’s study; the second part presents Reinach’s arguments concerning the perception of the other subject; and finally, I will explain how Reinach’s analysis contributes to that of Gallagher and Zahavi’s work and remark on what accessing to others’ mental state from the second-person perspective by combining the two positions means.
format	article
author	Marco Tedeschini
author_facet	Marco Tedeschini
author_sort	Marco Tedeschini
title	Perceiving subject and social cognition. Remarks from Adolf Reinach, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi
title_short	Perceiving subject and social cognition. Remarks from Adolf Reinach, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi
title_full	Perceiving subject and social cognition. Remarks from Adolf Reinach, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi
title_fullStr	Perceiving subject and social cognition. Remarks from Adolf Reinach, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi
title_full_unstemmed	Perceiving subject and social cognition. Remarks from Adolf Reinach, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi
title_sort	perceiving subject and social cognition. remarks from adolf reinach, shaun gallagher and dan zahavi
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/5bb8f23caeeb4b5bb31faa228f8338e4
work_keys_str_mv	AT marcotedeschini perceivingsubjectandsocialcognitionremarksfromadolfreinachshaungallagheranddanzahavi
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Perceiving subject and social cognition. Remarks from Adolf Reinach, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi

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