Normative Naturalism on Its Own Terms

Normative naturalism is primarily a metaphysical doctrine: there are normative facts and properties, and these fall into the class of natural facts and properties. Many objections to naturalism rely on additional assumptions about language or thought, but often without adequate consideration of just...

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Autor principal:	Pekka Väyrynen
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	CS EN SK
Publicado:	Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences 2021
Materias:	authoritative normativity normative concepts normative naturalism one-term naturalism practical normativity Philosophy (General) B1-5802
Acceso en línea:	https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28302 https://doaj.org/article/5c0be7b002094e929789796edbed2e03
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:5c0be7b002094e929789796edbed2e032021-11-30T16:14:31ZNormative Naturalism on Its Own Termshttps://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.283021335-06682585-7150https://doaj.org/article/5c0be7b002094e929789796edbed2e032021-08-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/09211020orgf.2021.28302.pdfhttps://doaj.org/toc/1335-0668https://doaj.org/toc/2585-7150Normative naturalism is primarily a metaphysical doctrine: there are normative facts and properties, and these fall into the class of natural facts and properties. Many objections to naturalism rely on additional assumptions about language or thought, but often without adequate consideration of just how normative properties would have to figure in our thought and talk if naturalism were true. In the first part of the paper, I explain why naturalists needn’t think that normative properties can be represented or ascribed in wholly non-normative terms. If so, certain prominent objections to normative naturalism fail. In the second part, I consider the objection that normative properties are “just too different” from (other) natural properties to themselves be natural properties. I argue that naturalists have no distinctive trouble making sense of thought and talk involving forms of “genuine” or “authoritative” normativity which can drive a non-question-begging form of the objection.Pekka VäyrynenInstitute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciencesarticleauthoritative normativitynormative conceptsnormative naturalismone-term naturalismpractical normativityPhilosophy (General)B1-5802CSENSKOrganon F, Vol 28, Iss 3, Pp 505-530 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	CS EN SK
topic	authoritative normativity normative concepts normative naturalism one-term naturalism practical normativity Philosophy (General) B1-5802
spellingShingle	authoritative normativity normative concepts normative naturalism one-term naturalism practical normativity Philosophy (General) B1-5802 Pekka Väyrynen Normative Naturalism on Its Own Terms
description	Normative naturalism is primarily a metaphysical doctrine: there are normative facts and properties, and these fall into the class of natural facts and properties. Many objections to naturalism rely on additional assumptions about language or thought, but often without adequate consideration of just how normative properties would have to figure in our thought and talk if naturalism were true. In the first part of the paper, I explain why naturalists needn’t think that normative properties can be represented or ascribed in wholly non-normative terms. If so, certain prominent objections to normative naturalism fail. In the second part, I consider the objection that normative properties are “just too different” from (other) natural properties to themselves be natural properties. I argue that naturalists have no distinctive trouble making sense of thought and talk involving forms of “genuine” or “authoritative” normativity which can drive a non-question-begging form of the objection.
format	article
author	Pekka Väyrynen
author_facet	Pekka Väyrynen
author_sort	Pekka Väyrynen
title	Normative Naturalism on Its Own Terms
title_short	Normative Naturalism on Its Own Terms
title_full	Normative Naturalism on Its Own Terms
title_fullStr	Normative Naturalism on Its Own Terms
title_full_unstemmed	Normative Naturalism on Its Own Terms
title_sort	normative naturalism on its own terms
publisher	Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
publishDate	2021
url	https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28302 https://doaj.org/article/5c0be7b002094e929789796edbed2e03
work_keys_str_mv	AT pekkavayrynen normativenaturalismonitsownterms
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Normative Naturalism on Its Own Terms

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