Reasonable Values and the Value of Reasonableness. Reflections on John Rawls’ Political Liberalism

This paper aims to question the idea of reasonableness in Rawls’ account of political liberalism. My point is that reasonableness as the moral basis of the liberal society provides restrictions for differences – be they philosophical, moral, religious, cultural – to be included in the liberal socie...

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Autor principal:	Roberta Sala
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	legitimacy toleration political justification agreement Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/5c74a8d38f5d4b29b5fcf1df69a55435
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:5c74a8d38f5d4b29b5fcf1df69a554352021-12-02T10:11:07ZReasonable Values and the Value of Reasonableness. Reflections on John Rawls’ Political Liberalism10.13128/Phe_Mi-196172280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/5c74a8d38f5d4b29b5fcf1df69a554352016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7099https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 This paper aims to question the idea of reasonableness in Rawls’ account of political liberalism. My point is that reasonableness as the moral basis of the liberal society provides restrictions for differences – be they philosophical, moral, religious, cultural – to be included in the liberal society. Notwithstanding Rawls’ attempt to expand political boundaries and to include those people who do not share moral liberal justification to justice as fairness, reasonableness selects “values holders” and assigns to the so-called “reasonable” a place in the political debate. The others, the “unreasonable”, are expected to become reasonable; alternatively, they would be paid control or even coercion in all the circumstances in which they should represent a risk for political stability. I believe that Rawls gives an incomplete account of unreasonableness: there may well be persons who are not “reasonable” in Rawlsian terms but who do not necessarily represent a danger for the just society. By the fact that they do not endorse values as freedom and equality in which fair cooperation is grounded, we cannot infer that they will necessarily try to violate the terms around which cooperation is structured by imposing their values on others. I proceed as follows: a) I detail the Rawlsian political turn in defending justice as fairness; b) I focus on the idea of reasonableness as the core of political liberalism; c) I defend the thesis that political liberalism needs to revise the idea of unreasonableness if it aims to deal with pluralism as a social and political fact. Roberta SalaRosenberg & Sellierarticlelegitimacytolerationpolitical justificationagreementAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 3 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	legitimacy toleration political justification agreement Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	legitimacy toleration political justification agreement Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Roberta Sala Reasonable Values and the Value of Reasonableness. Reflections on John Rawls’ Political Liberalism
description	This paper aims to question the idea of reasonableness in Rawls’ account of political liberalism. My point is that reasonableness as the moral basis of the liberal society provides restrictions for differences – be they philosophical, moral, religious, cultural – to be included in the liberal society. Notwithstanding Rawls’ attempt to expand political boundaries and to include those people who do not share moral liberal justification to justice as fairness, reasonableness selects “values holders” and assigns to the so-called “reasonable” a place in the political debate. The others, the “unreasonable”, are expected to become reasonable; alternatively, they would be paid control or even coercion in all the circumstances in which they should represent a risk for political stability. I believe that Rawls gives an incomplete account of unreasonableness: there may well be persons who are not “reasonable” in Rawlsian terms but who do not necessarily represent a danger for the just society. By the fact that they do not endorse values as freedom and equality in which fair cooperation is grounded, we cannot infer that they will necessarily try to violate the terms around which cooperation is structured by imposing their values on others. I proceed as follows: a) I detail the Rawlsian political turn in defending justice as fairness; b) I focus on the idea of reasonableness as the core of political liberalism; c) I defend the thesis that political liberalism needs to revise the idea of unreasonableness if it aims to deal with pluralism as a social and political fact.
format	article
author	Roberta Sala
author_facet	Roberta Sala
author_sort	Roberta Sala
title	Reasonable Values and the Value of Reasonableness. Reflections on John Rawls’ Political Liberalism
title_short	Reasonable Values and the Value of Reasonableness. Reflections on John Rawls’ Political Liberalism
title_full	Reasonable Values and the Value of Reasonableness. Reflections on John Rawls’ Political Liberalism
title_fullStr	Reasonable Values and the Value of Reasonableness. Reflections on John Rawls’ Political Liberalism
title_full_unstemmed	Reasonable Values and the Value of Reasonableness. Reflections on John Rawls’ Political Liberalism
title_sort	reasonable values and the value of reasonableness. reflections on john rawls’ political liberalism
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/5c74a8d38f5d4b29b5fcf1df69a55435
work_keys_str_mv	AT robertasala reasonablevaluesandthevalueofreasonablenessreflectionsonjohnrawlspoliticalliberalism
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Reasonable Values and the Value of Reasonableness. Reflections on John Rawls’ Political Liberalism

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