Presence of analyst before IPO and underpricing: a Meta-analysis.

The effect of analyst presence on underpricing has shown a contrasting result. By synthesizing the result using meta-analysis for twelve studies with more than 20400 firms we found conclusive evidence of the relation between analyst presence and underpricing of IPOs. With the increase in analyst pr...

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Autores principales: Udayan Karnatak, Chirag Malik
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Tuwhera Open Access Publisher 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/5d5e6c0c2da94157b34b5af68876ca9a
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:5d5e6c0c2da94157b34b5af68876ca9a2021-11-09T14:02:52ZPresence of analyst before IPO and underpricing: a Meta-analysis.10.24135/afl.v10i.4312253-57992253-5802https://doaj.org/article/5d5e6c0c2da94157b34b5af68876ca9a2021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://ojs.aut.ac.nz/applied-finance-letters/article/view/431https://doaj.org/toc/2253-5799https://doaj.org/toc/2253-5802 The effect of analyst presence on underpricing has shown a contrasting result. By synthesizing the result using meta-analysis for twelve studies with more than 20400 firms we found conclusive evidence of the relation between analyst presence and underpricing of IPOs. With the increase in analyst presence by 1% the IPO underpricing increases by 4.9%. Moreover, meta-regression between effect size and moderator variables found the significant and positive role of the reputed underwriter to increase underpricing when the IPO has coverage of analysts. Our results are striking for the US market IPOs in which reputed underwriters as moderator affect underpricing significantly and positively which shows reputation increase information asymmetry. Whereas in emerging markets IPOs reputed underwriters increase market efficiency and information symmetry. Udayan KarnatakChirag MalikTuwhera Open Access PublisherarticleFinanceHG1-9999ENApplied Finance Letters, Vol 10 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic Finance
HG1-9999
spellingShingle Finance
HG1-9999
Udayan Karnatak
Chirag Malik
Presence of analyst before IPO and underpricing: a Meta-analysis.
description The effect of analyst presence on underpricing has shown a contrasting result. By synthesizing the result using meta-analysis for twelve studies with more than 20400 firms we found conclusive evidence of the relation between analyst presence and underpricing of IPOs. With the increase in analyst presence by 1% the IPO underpricing increases by 4.9%. Moreover, meta-regression between effect size and moderator variables found the significant and positive role of the reputed underwriter to increase underpricing when the IPO has coverage of analysts. Our results are striking for the US market IPOs in which reputed underwriters as moderator affect underpricing significantly and positively which shows reputation increase information asymmetry. Whereas in emerging markets IPOs reputed underwriters increase market efficiency and information symmetry.
format article
author Udayan Karnatak
Chirag Malik
author_facet Udayan Karnatak
Chirag Malik
author_sort Udayan Karnatak
title Presence of analyst before IPO and underpricing: a Meta-analysis.
title_short Presence of analyst before IPO and underpricing: a Meta-analysis.
title_full Presence of analyst before IPO and underpricing: a Meta-analysis.
title_fullStr Presence of analyst before IPO and underpricing: a Meta-analysis.
title_full_unstemmed Presence of analyst before IPO and underpricing: a Meta-analysis.
title_sort presence of analyst before ipo and underpricing: a meta-analysis.
publisher Tuwhera Open Access Publisher
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/5d5e6c0c2da94157b34b5af68876ca9a
work_keys_str_mv AT udayankarnatak presenceofanalystbeforeipoandunderpricingametaanalysis
AT chiragmalik presenceofanalystbeforeipoandunderpricingametaanalysis
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