Does Reductivist Event-causal Compatibilism Leave Anything Out? Lynne Baker’s Reflective-Endorsement and the Bounds of the Traditional Analyses of Moral Responsibility
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Autor principal: | Sofia Bonicalzi |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
Publicado: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/5d9448b78ac546c2b006c4072415cb6d |
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