Building and Understanding the Minimal Self

Within the methodologically diverse interdisciplinary research on the minimal self, we identify two movements with seemingly disparate research agendas – cognitive science and cognitive (developmental) robotics. Cognitive science, on the one hand, devises rather abstract models which can predict and...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Valentin Forch, Fred H. Hamker
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Frontiers Media S.A. 2021
Materias:	minimal self mechanistic models cognitive robotics sense of agency sense of ownership Psychology BF1-990
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/6295704ae0d84064a03a483d7de846b3
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:6295704ae0d84064a03a483d7de846b3
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:6295704ae0d84064a03a483d7de846b32021-12-01T04:41:08ZBuilding and Understanding the Minimal Self1664-107810.3389/fpsyg.2021.716982https://doaj.org/article/6295704ae0d84064a03a483d7de846b32021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.716982/fullhttps://doaj.org/toc/1664-1078Within the methodologically diverse interdisciplinary research on the minimal self, we identify two movements with seemingly disparate research agendas – cognitive science and cognitive (developmental) robotics. Cognitive science, on the one hand, devises rather abstract models which can predict and explain human experimental data related to the minimal self. Incorporating the established models of cognitive science and ideas from artificial intelligence, cognitive robotics, on the other hand, aims to build embodied learning machines capable of developing a self “from scratch” similar to human infants. The epistemic promise of the latter approach is that, at some point, robotic models can serve as a testbed for directly investigating the mechanisms that lead to the emergence of the minimal self. While both approaches can be productive for creating causal mechanistic models of the minimal self, we argue that building a minimal self is different from understanding the human minimal self. Thus, one should be cautious when drawing conclusions about the human minimal self based on robotic model implementations and vice versa. We further point out that incorporating constraints arising from different levels of analysis will be crucial for creating models that can predict, generate, and causally explain behavior in the real world.Valentin ForchFred H. HamkerFrontiers Media S.A.articleminimal selfmechanistic modelscognitive roboticssense of agencysense of ownershipPsychologyBF1-990ENFrontiers in Psychology, Vol 12 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	minimal self mechanistic models cognitive robotics sense of agency sense of ownership Psychology BF1-990
spellingShingle	minimal self mechanistic models cognitive robotics sense of agency sense of ownership Psychology BF1-990 Valentin Forch Fred H. Hamker Building and Understanding the Minimal Self
description	Within the methodologically diverse interdisciplinary research on the minimal self, we identify two movements with seemingly disparate research agendas – cognitive science and cognitive (developmental) robotics. Cognitive science, on the one hand, devises rather abstract models which can predict and explain human experimental data related to the minimal self. Incorporating the established models of cognitive science and ideas from artificial intelligence, cognitive robotics, on the other hand, aims to build embodied learning machines capable of developing a self “from scratch” similar to human infants. The epistemic promise of the latter approach is that, at some point, robotic models can serve as a testbed for directly investigating the mechanisms that lead to the emergence of the minimal self. While both approaches can be productive for creating causal mechanistic models of the minimal self, we argue that building a minimal self is different from understanding the human minimal self. Thus, one should be cautious when drawing conclusions about the human minimal self based on robotic model implementations and vice versa. We further point out that incorporating constraints arising from different levels of analysis will be crucial for creating models that can predict, generate, and causally explain behavior in the real world.
format	article
author	Valentin Forch Fred H. Hamker
author_facet	Valentin Forch Fred H. Hamker
author_sort	Valentin Forch
title	Building and Understanding the Minimal Self
title_short	Building and Understanding the Minimal Self
title_full	Building and Understanding the Minimal Self
title_fullStr	Building and Understanding the Minimal Self
title_full_unstemmed	Building and Understanding the Minimal Self
title_sort	building and understanding the minimal self
publisher	Frontiers Media S.A.
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/6295704ae0d84064a03a483d7de846b3
work_keys_str_mv	AT valentinforch buildingandunderstandingtheminimalself AT fredhhamker buildingandunderstandingtheminimalself
_version_	1718405810656116736

Building and Understanding the Minimal Self

Ejemplares similares