Ethical Objections to Evolution in Contemporary Muslim Thought

Muslim creationists often argue that the theory of evolution is inherently unethical, claiming that concepts such as natural selection, survival of the fittest, and differential reproductive success promote behaviors like selfishness, violence, and sex- ual promiscuity. This article explores the di...

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Autor principal:	David Jalajel
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	International Institute of Islamic Thought 2010
Materias:	Islam BP1-253
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/63a96bbc188f4cddb7cf425d5fdf86c3
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:63a96bbc188f4cddb7cf425d5fdf86c32021-12-02T19:41:33ZEthical Objections to Evolution in Contemporary Muslim Thought10.35632/ajis.v27i3.3672690-37332690-3741https://doaj.org/article/63a96bbc188f4cddb7cf425d5fdf86c32010-07-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ajis.org/index.php/ajiss/article/view/367https://doaj.org/toc/2690-3733https://doaj.org/toc/2690-3741 Muslim creationists often argue that the theory of evolution is inherently unethical, claiming that concepts such as natural selection, survival of the fittest, and differential reproductive success promote behaviors like selfishness, violence, and sex- ual promiscuity. This article explores the distinctions made by classical Islamic theologians between God’s actions and human- ity’s actions and their potential to address ethical objections to evolution. The question is examined with reference to two theological traditions: the Ash`ari and the Salafi. The first one distinguishes between God’s creation of actions and humanity’s acquisition (kasab) of actions. According to this approach, ethical valuation is understood to be an attribute of human volitional action. The second approach, followed by Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn al-Qayyim, Ibn Abu al-`Izz, and others of the so-called Salafi tradition, distinguishes between God’s existential (kawni) will and legislative (shar`i) will. According to it, ethical valuation is restricted to the domain of what God legislates for His volitional creatures. Although these approaches differ in how they contextualize ethical behavior, both of them place ethical valuation strictly within the context of human volitional action. As a consequence, God’s actions in creation (and therefore what is observed in nature) can neither be taken as a pattern for determining ethical norms nor judged according to the ethical norms appropriate for human beings. The paper concludes that by making these distinctions, classical Islamic theology has the potential to effectively counter ethical objections to evolutionary theory. David JalajelInternational Institute of Islamic ThoughtarticleIslamBP1-253ENAmerican Journal of Islam and Society, Vol 27, Iss 3 (2010)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Islam BP1-253
spellingShingle	Islam BP1-253 David Jalajel Ethical Objections to Evolution in Contemporary Muslim Thought
description	Muslim creationists often argue that the theory of evolution is inherently unethical, claiming that concepts such as natural selection, survival of the fittest, and differential reproductive success promote behaviors like selfishness, violence, and sex- ual promiscuity. This article explores the distinctions made by classical Islamic theologians between God’s actions and human- ity’s actions and their potential to address ethical objections to evolution. The question is examined with reference to two theological traditions: the Ash`ari and the Salafi. The first one distinguishes between God’s creation of actions and humanity’s acquisition (kasab) of actions. According to this approach, ethical valuation is understood to be an attribute of human volitional action. The second approach, followed by Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn al-Qayyim, Ibn Abu al-`Izz, and others of the so-called Salafi tradition, distinguishes between God’s existential (kawni) will and legislative (shar`i) will. According to it, ethical valuation is restricted to the domain of what God legislates for His volitional creatures. Although these approaches differ in how they contextualize ethical behavior, both of them place ethical valuation strictly within the context of human volitional action. As a consequence, God’s actions in creation (and therefore what is observed in nature) can neither be taken as a pattern for determining ethical norms nor judged according to the ethical norms appropriate for human beings. The paper concludes that by making these distinctions, classical Islamic theology has the potential to effectively counter ethical objections to evolutionary theory.
format	article
author	David Jalajel
author_facet	David Jalajel
author_sort	David Jalajel
title	Ethical Objections to Evolution in Contemporary Muslim Thought
title_short	Ethical Objections to Evolution in Contemporary Muslim Thought
title_full	Ethical Objections to Evolution in Contemporary Muslim Thought
title_fullStr	Ethical Objections to Evolution in Contemporary Muslim Thought
title_full_unstemmed	Ethical Objections to Evolution in Contemporary Muslim Thought
title_sort	ethical objections to evolution in contemporary muslim thought
publisher	International Institute of Islamic Thought
publishDate	2010
url	https://doaj.org/article/63a96bbc188f4cddb7cf425d5fdf86c3
work_keys_str_mv	AT davidjalajel ethicalobjectionstoevolutionincontemporarymuslimthought
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Ethical Objections to Evolution in Contemporary Muslim Thought

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