Moscow Treaty of the USSR-Germany and «Letter on German Unity». From Conflict to Compromise

The article considers the course and results of the Soviet-West German negotiations that led to the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty of August 12, 1970, which became an important factor in defusing international tensions on the European continent. Special attention is paid to the problem of the genes...

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Autor principal:	A. M. Filitov
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN RU
Publicado:	MGIMO University Press 2019
Materias:	moscow treaty letter on german unity moscow bar mission a.a. gromyko v. brandt v. scheel International relations JZ2-6530
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/63e6568a6ba645c5b1290f46293e3200
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:63e6568a6ba645c5b1290f46293e32002021-11-23T14:50:41ZMoscow Treaty of the USSR-Germany and «Letter on German Unity». From Conflict to Compromise2071-81602541-909910.24833/2071-8160-2019-6-69-46-60https://doaj.org/article/63e6568a6ba645c5b1290f46293e32002019-12-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/1080https://doaj.org/toc/2071-8160https://doaj.org/toc/2541-9099The article considers the course and results of the Soviet-West German negotiations that led to the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty of August 12, 1970, which became an important factor in defusing international tensions on the European continent. Special attention is paid to the problem of the genesis of the so-called "Letter on German unity", the adoption of which the Soviet side stubbornly insisted on the representatives of Germany. The article reveals the flexible tactics of the Soviet delegation, which was headed by the Minister of foreign Affairs of the USSR AA. Gromyko: taking into account, in particular, the position of the GDR, the diplomats opposed the inclusion in the text of the Treaty of any provisions relating to the unification of Germany, but left open the prospect of such unification in the future. Some realism and willingness to compromise showed and West German negotiators, among whom special credit belongs to the personal emissary of Chancellor Brandt E. Bahr. On the basis of these compromises, a common position of the parties on the conclusion and subsequent ratification of the Moscow Treaty was worked out. The article pays due attention to the "US factor" in Soviet-West German relations. Formally declaring a positive attitude to the" new Eastern policy " of Germany, in fact the American side tried to compromise it in every possible way and complicate the process of preparing the Moscow Treaty. There is also some inconsistency in the German diplomacy in departing from previous political dogmas, primarily from the claims to the sole representation of all Germans. The main conclusion of the article is that as a result of the complex and sometimes conflicting Soviet-West German negotiation process, its participants managed to overcome the real contradiction between the principle of inviolability of borders and the right to national self-determination. In the current international situation, when this contradiction is artificially aggravated by the supporters of confrontation, the experience gained in the development and coordination of the provisions of the Moscow Treaty is of actual practical importance. The work is written on the basis of previously not entered into scientific circulation of primary sources from the Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, as well as published West German documents.The author declares absence of conflict of interests.A. M. FilitovMGIMO University Pressarticlemoscow treatyletter on german unitymoscow bar missiona.a. gromykov. brandtv. scheelInternational relationsJZ2-6530ENRUVestnik MGIMO-Universiteta, Vol 12, Iss 6, Pp 46-60 (2019)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN RU
topic	moscow treaty letter on german unity moscow bar mission a.a. gromyko v. brandt v. scheel International relations JZ2-6530
spellingShingle	moscow treaty letter on german unity moscow bar mission a.a. gromyko v. brandt v. scheel International relations JZ2-6530 A. M. Filitov Moscow Treaty of the USSR-Germany and «Letter on German Unity». From Conflict to Compromise
description	The article considers the course and results of the Soviet-West German negotiations that led to the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty of August 12, 1970, which became an important factor in defusing international tensions on the European continent. Special attention is paid to the problem of the genesis of the so-called "Letter on German unity", the adoption of which the Soviet side stubbornly insisted on the representatives of Germany. The article reveals the flexible tactics of the Soviet delegation, which was headed by the Minister of foreign Affairs of the USSR AA. Gromyko: taking into account, in particular, the position of the GDR, the diplomats opposed the inclusion in the text of the Treaty of any provisions relating to the unification of Germany, but left open the prospect of such unification in the future. Some realism and willingness to compromise showed and West German negotiators, among whom special credit belongs to the personal emissary of Chancellor Brandt E. Bahr. On the basis of these compromises, a common position of the parties on the conclusion and subsequent ratification of the Moscow Treaty was worked out. The article pays due attention to the "US factor" in Soviet-West German relations. Formally declaring a positive attitude to the" new Eastern policy " of Germany, in fact the American side tried to compromise it in every possible way and complicate the process of preparing the Moscow Treaty. There is also some inconsistency in the German diplomacy in departing from previous political dogmas, primarily from the claims to the sole representation of all Germans. The main conclusion of the article is that as a result of the complex and sometimes conflicting Soviet-West German negotiation process, its participants managed to overcome the real contradiction between the principle of inviolability of borders and the right to national self-determination. In the current international situation, when this contradiction is artificially aggravated by the supporters of confrontation, the experience gained in the development and coordination of the provisions of the Moscow Treaty is of actual practical importance. The work is written on the basis of previously not entered into scientific circulation of primary sources from the Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, as well as published West German documents.The author declares absence of conflict of interests.
format	article
author	A. M. Filitov
author_facet	A. M. Filitov
author_sort	A. M. Filitov
title	Moscow Treaty of the USSR-Germany and «Letter on German Unity». From Conflict to Compromise
title_short	Moscow Treaty of the USSR-Germany and «Letter on German Unity». From Conflict to Compromise
title_full	Moscow Treaty of the USSR-Germany and «Letter on German Unity». From Conflict to Compromise
title_fullStr	Moscow Treaty of the USSR-Germany and «Letter on German Unity». From Conflict to Compromise
title_full_unstemmed	Moscow Treaty of the USSR-Germany and «Letter on German Unity». From Conflict to Compromise
title_sort	moscow treaty of the ussr-germany and «letter on german unity». from conflict to compromise
publisher	MGIMO University Press
publishDate	2019
url	https://doaj.org/article/63e6568a6ba645c5b1290f46293e3200
work_keys_str_mv	AT amfilitov moscowtreatyoftheussrgermanyandletterongermanunityfromconflicttocompromise
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Moscow Treaty of the USSR-Germany and «Letter on German Unity». From Conflict to Compromise

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