Platform Revenue Strategy Selection Considering Consumer Group Data Privacy Regulation

In the era of big data, consumer group privacy has become an important source of revenue for the digital platform. Considering the situation that the platform collects consumer group data privacy to generate business revenue, we explore how the service matching level and commission rate affect the p...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Xudong Lin, Shuilin Liu, Xiaoli Huang, Hanyang Luo, Sumin Yu
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	MDPI AG 2021
Materias:	group privacy data service matching level platform revenue strategy data regulation Mathematics QA1-939
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/6455b625fa544931a7af1f26a42a5530
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:6455b625fa544931a7af1f26a42a5530
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:6455b625fa544931a7af1f26a42a55302021-11-25T18:17:04ZPlatform Revenue Strategy Selection Considering Consumer Group Data Privacy Regulation10.3390/math92229042227-7390https://doaj.org/article/6455b625fa544931a7af1f26a42a55302021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/9/22/2904https://doaj.org/toc/2227-7390In the era of big data, consumer group privacy has become an important source of revenue for the digital platform. Considering the situation that the platform collects consumer group data privacy to generate business revenue, we explore how the service matching level and commission rate affect the platform revenue, social welfare, and seller benefits. Based on the theory of group privacy, the three-party equilibrium evolution is solved by constructing a sequential game model including platform, seller, and consumer alliance. It is found that when the service matching level of the platform is greater than the threshold value, there are two main situations: on the one hand, if using the data privacy of a consumer group is subject to market regulation, the platform will set a high commission rate and service matching level in order to maximize profit. However, social welfare and seller’s business benefit both reach a minimum in this case, and the three-party game cannot attain equilibrium. On the other hand, when the market governor relaxes the platform’s regulation on the use of consumer group privacy data and data revenue efficiency is high enough, the platform can maximize the revenue by increasing the service matching level and reducing the commission rate. The optimal commission rate depends on the data revenue efficiency of the platform. Moreover, when the platform sets the highest commission rate and the service matching level is at a medium level, a stable partial equilibrium among the three-party will be achieved. These conclusions can give some insights into platform’s business model choice decision.Xudong LinShuilin LiuXiaoli HuangHanyang LuoSumin YuMDPI AGarticlegroup privacy dataservice matching levelplatform revenue strategydata regulationMathematicsQA1-939ENMathematics, Vol 9, Iss 2904, p 2904 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	group privacy data service matching level platform revenue strategy data regulation Mathematics QA1-939
spellingShingle	group privacy data service matching level platform revenue strategy data regulation Mathematics QA1-939 Xudong Lin Shuilin Liu Xiaoli Huang Hanyang Luo Sumin Yu Platform Revenue Strategy Selection Considering Consumer Group Data Privacy Regulation
description	In the era of big data, consumer group privacy has become an important source of revenue for the digital platform. Considering the situation that the platform collects consumer group data privacy to generate business revenue, we explore how the service matching level and commission rate affect the platform revenue, social welfare, and seller benefits. Based on the theory of group privacy, the three-party equilibrium evolution is solved by constructing a sequential game model including platform, seller, and consumer alliance. It is found that when the service matching level of the platform is greater than the threshold value, there are two main situations: on the one hand, if using the data privacy of a consumer group is subject to market regulation, the platform will set a high commission rate and service matching level in order to maximize profit. However, social welfare and seller’s business benefit both reach a minimum in this case, and the three-party game cannot attain equilibrium. On the other hand, when the market governor relaxes the platform’s regulation on the use of consumer group privacy data and data revenue efficiency is high enough, the platform can maximize the revenue by increasing the service matching level and reducing the commission rate. The optimal commission rate depends on the data revenue efficiency of the platform. Moreover, when the platform sets the highest commission rate and the service matching level is at a medium level, a stable partial equilibrium among the three-party will be achieved. These conclusions can give some insights into platform’s business model choice decision.
format	article
author	Xudong Lin Shuilin Liu Xiaoli Huang Hanyang Luo Sumin Yu
author_facet	Xudong Lin Shuilin Liu Xiaoli Huang Hanyang Luo Sumin Yu
author_sort	Xudong Lin
title	Platform Revenue Strategy Selection Considering Consumer Group Data Privacy Regulation
title_short	Platform Revenue Strategy Selection Considering Consumer Group Data Privacy Regulation
title_full	Platform Revenue Strategy Selection Considering Consumer Group Data Privacy Regulation
title_fullStr	Platform Revenue Strategy Selection Considering Consumer Group Data Privacy Regulation
title_full_unstemmed	Platform Revenue Strategy Selection Considering Consumer Group Data Privacy Regulation
title_sort	platform revenue strategy selection considering consumer group data privacy regulation
publisher	MDPI AG
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/6455b625fa544931a7af1f26a42a5530
work_keys_str_mv	AT xudonglin platformrevenuestrategyselectionconsideringconsumergroupdataprivacyregulation AT shuilinliu platformrevenuestrategyselectionconsideringconsumergroupdataprivacyregulation AT xiaolihuang platformrevenuestrategyselectionconsideringconsumergroupdataprivacyregulation AT hanyangluo platformrevenuestrategyselectionconsideringconsumergroupdataprivacyregulation AT suminyu platformrevenuestrategyselectionconsideringconsumergroupdataprivacyregulation
_version_	1718411384914444288

Platform Revenue Strategy Selection Considering Consumer Group Data Privacy Regulation

Ejemplares similares