On Acting Because of a Joint Commitment
I focus on the motivational role that Gilbert attributes to joint commitment. Using Bacharach’s game theoretical analysis of non-summative group agency, I point out that Gilbert’s account of social actions conceptually requires the obliteration of individual preferences and individual rationality....
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
| Publicado: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/6815090a52834f629f3edd49a9a381df |
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| Sumario: | I focus on the motivational role that Gilbert attributes to joint commitment. Using Bacharach’s game theoretical analysis of non-summative group agency, I point out that Gilbert’s account of social actions conceptually requires the obliteration of individual preferences and individual rationality. Then, I investigate whether acting because of a joint commitment is rational in some sense, focusing primarily on the phenomenon of asking and giving the permission to defect (fair defection) when a joint commitment is in place. I show that the obliteration of individual preferences prevents the possibility of rational fair defection. Finally, I analyze Gilbert’s recent suggestion concerning the introduction of personal preferences in her account, and I show that such introduction cannot solve the problem with the
(ir)rationality of fair defection, and that personal preferences can hardly be consistently included in Gilbert’s account.
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