On Acting Because of a Joint Commitment

I focus on the motivational role that Gilbert attributes to joint commitment. Using Bacharach’s game theoretical analysis of non-summative group agency, I point out that Gilbert’s account of social actions conceptually requires the obliteration of individual preferences and individual rationality....

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Autor principal:	Silvia Tossut
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	joint commitment game theory Bacharach Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/6815090a52834f629f3edd49a9a381df
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:6815090a52834f629f3edd49a9a381df
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:6815090a52834f629f3edd49a9a381df2021-12-02T10:23:37ZOn Acting Because of a Joint Commitment10.13128/Phe_Mi-181502280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/6815090a52834f629f3edd49a9a381df2016-04-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7212https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 I focus on the motivational role that Gilbert attributes to joint commitment. Using Bacharach’s game theoretical analysis of non-summative group agency, I point out that Gilbert’s account of social actions conceptually requires the obliteration of individual preferences and individual rationality. Then, I investigate whether acting because of a joint commitment is rational in some sense, focusing primarily on the phenomenon of asking and giving the permission to defect (fair defection) when a joint commitment is in place. I show that the obliteration of individual preferences prevents the possibility of rational fair defection. Finally, I analyze Gilbert’s recent suggestion concerning the introduction of personal preferences in her account, and I show that such introduction cannot solve the problem with the (ir)rationality of fair defection, and that personal preferences can hardly be consistently included in Gilbert’s account. Silvia TossutRosenberg & Sellierarticlejoint commitmentgame theoryBacharachAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 9 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	joint commitment game theory Bacharach Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	joint commitment game theory Bacharach Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Silvia Tossut On Acting Because of a Joint Commitment
description	I focus on the motivational role that Gilbert attributes to joint commitment. Using Bacharach’s game theoretical analysis of non-summative group agency, I point out that Gilbert’s account of social actions conceptually requires the obliteration of individual preferences and individual rationality. Then, I investigate whether acting because of a joint commitment is rational in some sense, focusing primarily on the phenomenon of asking and giving the permission to defect (fair defection) when a joint commitment is in place. I show that the obliteration of individual preferences prevents the possibility of rational fair defection. Finally, I analyze Gilbert’s recent suggestion concerning the introduction of personal preferences in her account, and I show that such introduction cannot solve the problem with the (ir)rationality of fair defection, and that personal preferences can hardly be consistently included in Gilbert’s account.
format	article
author	Silvia Tossut
author_facet	Silvia Tossut
author_sort	Silvia Tossut
title	On Acting Because of a Joint Commitment
title_short	On Acting Because of a Joint Commitment
title_full	On Acting Because of a Joint Commitment
title_fullStr	On Acting Because of a Joint Commitment
title_full_unstemmed	On Acting Because of a Joint Commitment
title_sort	on acting because of a joint commitment
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/6815090a52834f629f3edd49a9a381df
work_keys_str_mv	AT silviatossut onactingbecauseofajointcommitment
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On Acting Because of a Joint Commitment

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