Options for Synthetic DNA Order Screening, Revisited
ABSTRACT Gene synthesis providers affiliated with the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC) voluntarily screen double-stranded DNA (dsDNA) synthesis orders over 200 bp to check for matches to regulated pathogens and to screen customers. Questions have been raised, however, about the continu...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
American Society for Microbiology
2017
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/682f974db32c460998ab7e11ede71450 |
| Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
| Sumario: | ABSTRACT Gene synthesis providers affiliated with the International Gene Synthesis Consortium (IGSC) voluntarily screen double-stranded DNA (dsDNA) synthesis orders over 200 bp to check for matches to regulated pathogens and to screen customers. Questions have been raised, however, about the continuing feasibility and effectiveness of screening. There are technical challenges (e.g., oligonucleotides and tracts of DNA less than 200 bp are not screened) and corporate challenges (e.g., the costs of screening are high, but other costs are dropping, so screening is an increasing portion of operating costs). In this article, we describe tangible actions that should be taken to (i) preserve the effectiveness of DNA order screening as a security tool and (ii) develop additional mechanisms to increase the safety and security of DNA synthesis technologies. Screening is not a perfect solution to DNA synthesis security challenges, but we believe it is still a valuable addition to security, and it can remain effective for some time. |
|---|