Metaphysically Lightweight Posits
We discuss metaphysically lightweight posits, providing some examples. The ontological assertion is that the right ontology does not include any lightweight posits. There are two semantical claims: statements about lightweight posits are often true in context, and truth is often indirect correspond...
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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oai:doaj.org-article:69dcdeed299e42c2b75856d2d4ded88d2021-12-02T09:29:57ZMetaphysically Lightweight Posits10.13128/Phe_Mi-196232280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/69dcdeed299e42c2b75856d2d4ded88d2016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7070https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 We discuss metaphysically lightweight posits, providing some examples. The ontological assertion is that the right ontology does not include any lightweight posits. There are two semantical claims: statements about lightweight posits are often true in context, and truth is often indirect correspondence. Methodological claim is that this approach fits well with reflective common sense, considering the dialectics involving naïve common sense realism, common sense antinomies and the reflective or austere realism. This kind of approach is roughly compatible with Searle’s view on the same matters in his story about the construction of social reality. Matjaž PotrcRosenberg & Sellierarticlemetaphysically lightweight positstruth as indirect correspondencereflective common senseAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 2 (2016) |
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EN FR IT |
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metaphysically lightweight posits truth as indirect correspondence reflective common sense Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 |
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metaphysically lightweight posits truth as indirect correspondence reflective common sense Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Matjaž Potrc Metaphysically Lightweight Posits |
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We discuss metaphysically lightweight posits, providing some examples. The ontological assertion is that the right ontology does not include any lightweight posits. There are two semantical claims: statements about lightweight posits are often true in context, and truth is often indirect correspondence. Methodological claim is that this approach fits well with reflective common sense, considering the dialectics involving naïve common sense realism, common sense antinomies and the reflective or austere realism. This kind of approach is roughly compatible with Searle’s view on the same matters in his story about the construction of social reality.
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| format |
article |
| author |
Matjaž Potrc |
| author_facet |
Matjaž Potrc |
| author_sort |
Matjaž Potrc |
| title |
Metaphysically Lightweight Posits |
| title_short |
Metaphysically Lightweight Posits |
| title_full |
Metaphysically Lightweight Posits |
| title_fullStr |
Metaphysically Lightweight Posits |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Metaphysically Lightweight Posits |
| title_sort |
metaphysically lightweight posits |
| publisher |
Rosenberg & Sellier |
| publishDate |
2016 |
| url |
https://doaj.org/article/69dcdeed299e42c2b75856d2d4ded88d |
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AT matjazpotrc metaphysicallylightweightposits |
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