Metaphysically Lightweight Posits
We discuss metaphysically lightweight posits, providing some examples. The ontological assertion is that the right ontology does not include any lightweight posits. There are two semantical claims: statements about lightweight posits are often true in context, and truth is often indirect correspond...
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Autor principal: | Matjaž Potrc |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
Publicado: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/69dcdeed299e42c2b75856d2d4ded88d |
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