Climate change, shifting threat points, and the management of transboundary fish stocks

We apply the concept of threat points in game theory to explore the stability of current joint management arrangements for shared transboundary fish stocks between Canada and the United States. We use three examples to explore the effects of projected impacts of climate change on the productivity an...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: U. Rashid Sumaila, Juliano Palacios-Abrantes, William W. L. Cheung
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Resilience Alliance 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/6a210a78f83a4e0d96fbd8f128e593ad
Etiquetas: Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
id oai:doaj.org-article:6a210a78f83a4e0d96fbd8f128e593ad
record_format dspace
spelling oai:doaj.org-article:6a210a78f83a4e0d96fbd8f128e593ad2021-12-02T14:38:19ZClimate change, shifting threat points, and the management of transboundary fish stocks1708-308710.5751/ES-11660-250440https://doaj.org/article/6a210a78f83a4e0d96fbd8f128e593ad2020-12-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol25/iss4/art40/https://doaj.org/toc/1708-3087We apply the concept of threat points in game theory to explore the stability of current joint management arrangements for shared transboundary fish stocks between Canada and the United States. We use three examples to explore the effects of projected impacts of climate change on the productivity and distribution of these stocks between the exclusive economic zones of the two countries. The three stocks that we study are: Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) and yellowtail flounder (Limanda ferruginea) within the Gulf of Maine, and Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) in the Pacific Coast. We define a threat point as the payoffs that the fisheries in Canada and the United States take home given the current management agreement between the two countries. This is an application of John Nash's threat point, defined as the minimum payoffs that each player in a game theoretic model must receive for the solution to a cooperative game to be stable, which is usually the outcome of a noncooperative game. First, we compute the threat points, that is, the current profits that Canada and the United States derive from the three shared stocks, respectively. Next, we build an ensemble of climate-marine ecosystem and economic models and use them to determine how climate change is likely to change current profits received by each country relative to the shifts in their threat points. We find that in some cases the profits obtained by fisheries in Canada and the United States would change under climate change both in absolute and relative terms resulting in relative changes in threat points. These relative changes in threat points serve as the basis for our discussion of the stability of current transboundary management agreements between Canada and the United States for these important shared stocks in the face of climate change.U. Rashid SumailaJuliano Palacios-AbrantesWilliam W. L. CheungResilience Alliancearticleatlantic codclimate changejoint managementpacific halibutshared stocksyellowtail flounderBiology (General)QH301-705.5EcologyQH540-549.5ENEcology and Society, Vol 25, Iss 4, p 40 (2020)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic atlantic cod
climate change
joint management
pacific halibut
shared stocks
yellowtail flounder
Biology (General)
QH301-705.5
Ecology
QH540-549.5
spellingShingle atlantic cod
climate change
joint management
pacific halibut
shared stocks
yellowtail flounder
Biology (General)
QH301-705.5
Ecology
QH540-549.5
U. Rashid Sumaila
Juliano Palacios-Abrantes
William W. L. Cheung
Climate change, shifting threat points, and the management of transboundary fish stocks
description We apply the concept of threat points in game theory to explore the stability of current joint management arrangements for shared transboundary fish stocks between Canada and the United States. We use three examples to explore the effects of projected impacts of climate change on the productivity and distribution of these stocks between the exclusive economic zones of the two countries. The three stocks that we study are: Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) and yellowtail flounder (Limanda ferruginea) within the Gulf of Maine, and Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) in the Pacific Coast. We define a threat point as the payoffs that the fisheries in Canada and the United States take home given the current management agreement between the two countries. This is an application of John Nash's threat point, defined as the minimum payoffs that each player in a game theoretic model must receive for the solution to a cooperative game to be stable, which is usually the outcome of a noncooperative game. First, we compute the threat points, that is, the current profits that Canada and the United States derive from the three shared stocks, respectively. Next, we build an ensemble of climate-marine ecosystem and economic models and use them to determine how climate change is likely to change current profits received by each country relative to the shifts in their threat points. We find that in some cases the profits obtained by fisheries in Canada and the United States would change under climate change both in absolute and relative terms resulting in relative changes in threat points. These relative changes in threat points serve as the basis for our discussion of the stability of current transboundary management agreements between Canada and the United States for these important shared stocks in the face of climate change.
format article
author U. Rashid Sumaila
Juliano Palacios-Abrantes
William W. L. Cheung
author_facet U. Rashid Sumaila
Juliano Palacios-Abrantes
William W. L. Cheung
author_sort U. Rashid Sumaila
title Climate change, shifting threat points, and the management of transboundary fish stocks
title_short Climate change, shifting threat points, and the management of transboundary fish stocks
title_full Climate change, shifting threat points, and the management of transboundary fish stocks
title_fullStr Climate change, shifting threat points, and the management of transboundary fish stocks
title_full_unstemmed Climate change, shifting threat points, and the management of transboundary fish stocks
title_sort climate change, shifting threat points, and the management of transboundary fish stocks
publisher Resilience Alliance
publishDate 2020
url https://doaj.org/article/6a210a78f83a4e0d96fbd8f128e593ad
work_keys_str_mv AT urashidsumaila climatechangeshiftingthreatpointsandthemanagementoftransboundaryfishstocks
AT julianopalaciosabrantes climatechangeshiftingthreatpointsandthemanagementoftransboundaryfishstocks
AT williamwlcheung climatechangeshiftingthreatpointsandthemanagementoftransboundaryfishstocks
_version_ 1718390955109777408