Utilitarianism in minimal-group decision making is less common than equality-based morality, mostly harm-oriented, and rarely impartial

Abstract In the study of utilitarian morality, the sacrificial dilemma paradigm has been the dominant approach for years. However, to address some of the most pressing issues in the current research literature, the present studies adopt an alternative approach by using a minimal group paradigm in wh...

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Autores principales:	Arne Roets, Dries H. Bostyn, Jonas De keersmaecker, Tessa Haesevoets, Jasper Van Assche, Alain Van Hiel
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2020
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/6a7bcdd2540b4a71b33569478c860617
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:6a7bcdd2540b4a71b33569478c8606172021-12-02T16:34:04ZUtilitarianism in minimal-group decision making is less common than equality-based morality, mostly harm-oriented, and rarely impartial10.1038/s41598-020-70199-42045-2322https://doaj.org/article/6a7bcdd2540b4a71b33569478c8606172020-08-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-70199-4https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract In the study of utilitarian morality, the sacrificial dilemma paradigm has been the dominant approach for years. However, to address some of the most pressing issues in the current research literature, the present studies adopt an alternative approach by using a minimal group paradigm in which participants have to make decisions about the allocation of resources. This approach allows not only to pit utilitarianism against equality-based morality, but also to study these modes of morality for both harm and benefit, and to directly address the role of group identity affecting the (im)partial nature of ‘utilitarian’ (i.e., outcome maximizing) decisions. In our experiments, across four different samples (total N = 946), we demonstrate that although participants generally prefer equality-based allocations over maximizing distributions, outcome maximizing choices become more prevalent when they served to minimize harm compared to maximizing benefit. Furthermore, reducing the objective value of the equal distribution outcomes further prompts participants to adopt a more utilitarian approach in situations involving harm, but has little effect in situations where benefits have to be distributed. Finally, the introduction of (minimal) group identity consistently demonstrates that decisions that maximize the overall outcome are more likely if they also serve the ingroup compared to when they rather serve the outgroup. We discuss how these findings have meaningful implications that may be especially relevant for recent movements that advocate a utilitarian approach to charity, and for our understanding of (im)partiality in lay people’s ‘utilitarian’ decision making.Arne RoetsDries H. BostynJonas De keersmaeckerTessa HaesevoetsJasper Van AsscheAlain Van HielNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 10, Iss 1, Pp 1-10 (2020)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Arne Roets Dries H. Bostyn Jonas De keersmaecker Tessa Haesevoets Jasper Van Assche Alain Van Hiel Utilitarianism in minimal-group decision making is less common than equality-based morality, mostly harm-oriented, and rarely impartial
description	Abstract In the study of utilitarian morality, the sacrificial dilemma paradigm has been the dominant approach for years. However, to address some of the most pressing issues in the current research literature, the present studies adopt an alternative approach by using a minimal group paradigm in which participants have to make decisions about the allocation of resources. This approach allows not only to pit utilitarianism against equality-based morality, but also to study these modes of morality for both harm and benefit, and to directly address the role of group identity affecting the (im)partial nature of ‘utilitarian’ (i.e., outcome maximizing) decisions. In our experiments, across four different samples (total N = 946), we demonstrate that although participants generally prefer equality-based allocations over maximizing distributions, outcome maximizing choices become more prevalent when they served to minimize harm compared to maximizing benefit. Furthermore, reducing the objective value of the equal distribution outcomes further prompts participants to adopt a more utilitarian approach in situations involving harm, but has little effect in situations where benefits have to be distributed. Finally, the introduction of (minimal) group identity consistently demonstrates that decisions that maximize the overall outcome are more likely if they also serve the ingroup compared to when they rather serve the outgroup. We discuss how these findings have meaningful implications that may be especially relevant for recent movements that advocate a utilitarian approach to charity, and for our understanding of (im)partiality in lay people’s ‘utilitarian’ decision making.
format	article
author	Arne Roets Dries H. Bostyn Jonas De keersmaecker Tessa Haesevoets Jasper Van Assche Alain Van Hiel
author_facet	Arne Roets Dries H. Bostyn Jonas De keersmaecker Tessa Haesevoets Jasper Van Assche Alain Van Hiel
author_sort	Arne Roets
title	Utilitarianism in minimal-group decision making is less common than equality-based morality, mostly harm-oriented, and rarely impartial
title_short	Utilitarianism in minimal-group decision making is less common than equality-based morality, mostly harm-oriented, and rarely impartial
title_full	Utilitarianism in minimal-group decision making is less common than equality-based morality, mostly harm-oriented, and rarely impartial
title_fullStr	Utilitarianism in minimal-group decision making is less common than equality-based morality, mostly harm-oriented, and rarely impartial
title_full_unstemmed	Utilitarianism in minimal-group decision making is less common than equality-based morality, mostly harm-oriented, and rarely impartial
title_sort	utilitarianism in minimal-group decision making is less common than equality-based morality, mostly harm-oriented, and rarely impartial
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2020
url	https://doaj.org/article/6a7bcdd2540b4a71b33569478c860617
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Utilitarianism in minimal-group decision making is less common than equality-based morality, mostly harm-oriented, and rarely impartial

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