“Revolving Doors” Practices in Russia: The Regional Aspect
The article is devoted to the study of the practice of moving former civil servants and parliamentarians to work in the commercial sector and vice versa. The theory of "revolving doors" serves as a conceptual framework for this research, in the first part of which the main approaches to th...
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | RU |
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Publishing House Discourse-P
2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/6c0ff6d536f54ca0b47b204cab946ae8 |
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| Sumario: | The article is devoted to the study of the practice of moving former civil servants and parliamentarians to work in the commercial sector and vice versa. The theory of "revolving doors" serves as a conceptual framework for this research, in the first part of which the main approaches to the definition of this concept are considered. Using this theory, the authors of the article seek to provide answers to a number of research questions. To what extent is the "revolving door" phenomenon peculiar to the political life in the Russian regions and, in particular, in the Sverdlovsk region? What is the percentage of officials moving from the civil service to the private sector to become a "lobbyist" and/or a government relations manager (GR manager) and vice versa? To find the answers, the authors apply a biographical approach, using a database that includes information about all former and current heads of regional executive bodies of state power in the Sverdlovsk region, analyze information about the work of regional ministers. Another group ofsources is the Internet materials including the official websites of the regional government. The main method of analyzing quantitative data is descriptive statistics. According to the results of the study, the authors conclude that commercial companies are the second most popular place of work both before the appointment and after the dismissal of a ministerial position; ex-ministers often become directors of enterprises and GR managers. The reasons for this state of affairs are revealed. The explanatory model is based on the concept ofsupply and demand. Calculations show that less than 10% of enterprises have structural divisions responsible for government relations. The limiting factor is the desire of heads of commercial enterprises to directly participate in politics to promote corporate interests, and not to apply to communication agencies for GR support. |
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