Vers une phénoménologie de la normativité. Une circonscription préliminaire du domaine

I discuss, from a phenomenological point of view, the distinction between judgments and norms. I stress the limits of the Husserlian canonical analysis in order to rightly account for the sense and content of normative intentionality. Based on some Kelsenian insights, I draw a clear distinction bet...

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Autor principal: Pedro Alves
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FR
IT
Publicado: Rosenberg & Sellier 2017
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:6f16e049b9f940dbb82e32716f2421152021-12-02T10:50:48ZVers une phénoménologie de la normativité. Une circonscription préliminaire du domaine10.13128/Phe_Mi-224302280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/6f16e049b9f940dbb82e32716f2421152017-12-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7290https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 I discuss, from a phenomenological point of view, the distinction between judgments and norms. I stress the limits of the Husserlian canonical analysis in order to rightly account for the sense and content of normative intentionality. Based on some Kelsenian insights, I draw a clear distinction between judgments and norms, criticizing some classical trends coming from Husserl himself that consider norms as a kind of intentionality founded upon objectifying acts. However, taking distance from Kelsen, Kaufmann, and Cossio, I stress that the ought-proposition (Sollsatz) cannot be a good rendering of the sense-content of norms, based on the phenomenological distinction between the intentional matter and the quality of intentional acts. Finally, I propose my own account based on the concept of “ductive force”. I stress that the ductive force of norms cannot be identified with simple coercion. I show that there is, even inside the juridical sphere, a variety of ductive forces, going from sheer coercion to council and recommendation. To end, I stress the centrality of the concept of “ductive force” for a phenomenology of the social world. Pedro AlvesRosenberg & Sellierarticlephenomenology of lawnormsjudgments thetic actsAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 13 (2017)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
FR
IT
topic phenomenology of law
norms
judgments thetic acts
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
spellingShingle phenomenology of law
norms
judgments thetic acts
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
Pedro Alves
Vers une phénoménologie de la normativité. Une circonscription préliminaire du domaine
description I discuss, from a phenomenological point of view, the distinction between judgments and norms. I stress the limits of the Husserlian canonical analysis in order to rightly account for the sense and content of normative intentionality. Based on some Kelsenian insights, I draw a clear distinction between judgments and norms, criticizing some classical trends coming from Husserl himself that consider norms as a kind of intentionality founded upon objectifying acts. However, taking distance from Kelsen, Kaufmann, and Cossio, I stress that the ought-proposition (Sollsatz) cannot be a good rendering of the sense-content of norms, based on the phenomenological distinction between the intentional matter and the quality of intentional acts. Finally, I propose my own account based on the concept of “ductive force”. I stress that the ductive force of norms cannot be identified with simple coercion. I show that there is, even inside the juridical sphere, a variety of ductive forces, going from sheer coercion to council and recommendation. To end, I stress the centrality of the concept of “ductive force” for a phenomenology of the social world.
format article
author Pedro Alves
author_facet Pedro Alves
author_sort Pedro Alves
title Vers une phénoménologie de la normativité. Une circonscription préliminaire du domaine
title_short Vers une phénoménologie de la normativité. Une circonscription préliminaire du domaine
title_full Vers une phénoménologie de la normativité. Une circonscription préliminaire du domaine
title_fullStr Vers une phénoménologie de la normativité. Une circonscription préliminaire du domaine
title_full_unstemmed Vers une phénoménologie de la normativité. Une circonscription préliminaire du domaine
title_sort vers une phénoménologie de la normativité. une circonscription préliminaire du domaine
publisher Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate 2017
url https://doaj.org/article/6f16e049b9f940dbb82e32716f242115
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