A model of human cooperation in social dilemmas.

Social dilemmas are situations in which collective interests are at odds with private interests: pollution, depletion of natural resources, and intergroup conflicts, are at their core social dilemmas. Because of their multidisciplinarity and their importance, social dilemmas have been studied by eco...

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Autor principal:	Valerio Capraro
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2013
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/7088cf4002604b30bd7cae03c33b6875
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:7088cf4002604b30bd7cae03c33b68752021-11-18T08:57:46ZA model of human cooperation in social dilemmas.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0072427https://doaj.org/article/7088cf4002604b30bd7cae03c33b68752013-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/24009679/?tool=EBIhttps://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203Social dilemmas are situations in which collective interests are at odds with private interests: pollution, depletion of natural resources, and intergroup conflicts, are at their core social dilemmas. Because of their multidisciplinarity and their importance, social dilemmas have been studied by economists, biologists, psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists. These studies typically explain tendency to cooperation by dividing people in proself and prosocial types, or appealing to forms of external control or, in iterated social dilemmas, to long-term strategies. But recent experiments have shown that cooperation is possible even in one-shot social dilemmas without forms of external control and the rate of cooperation typically depends on the payoffs. This makes impossible a predictive division between proself and prosocial people and proves that people have attitude to cooperation by nature. The key innovation of this article is in fact to postulate that humans have attitude to cooperation by nature and consequently they do not act a priori as single agents, as assumed by standard economic models, but they forecast how a social dilemma would evolve if they formed coalitions and then they act according to their most optimistic forecast. Formalizing this idea we propose the first predictive model of human cooperation able to organize a number of different experimental findings that are not explained by the standard model. We show also that the model makes satisfactorily accurate quantitative predictions of population average behavior in one-shot social dilemmas.Valerio CapraroPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 8, Iss 8, p e72427 (2013)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Valerio Capraro A model of human cooperation in social dilemmas.
description	Social dilemmas are situations in which collective interests are at odds with private interests: pollution, depletion of natural resources, and intergroup conflicts, are at their core social dilemmas. Because of their multidisciplinarity and their importance, social dilemmas have been studied by economists, biologists, psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists. These studies typically explain tendency to cooperation by dividing people in proself and prosocial types, or appealing to forms of external control or, in iterated social dilemmas, to long-term strategies. But recent experiments have shown that cooperation is possible even in one-shot social dilemmas without forms of external control and the rate of cooperation typically depends on the payoffs. This makes impossible a predictive division between proself and prosocial people and proves that people have attitude to cooperation by nature. The key innovation of this article is in fact to postulate that humans have attitude to cooperation by nature and consequently they do not act a priori as single agents, as assumed by standard economic models, but they forecast how a social dilemma would evolve if they formed coalitions and then they act according to their most optimistic forecast. Formalizing this idea we propose the first predictive model of human cooperation able to organize a number of different experimental findings that are not explained by the standard model. We show also that the model makes satisfactorily accurate quantitative predictions of population average behavior in one-shot social dilemmas.
format	article
author	Valerio Capraro
author_facet	Valerio Capraro
author_sort	Valerio Capraro
title	A model of human cooperation in social dilemmas.
title_short	A model of human cooperation in social dilemmas.
title_full	A model of human cooperation in social dilemmas.
title_fullStr	A model of human cooperation in social dilemmas.
title_full_unstemmed	A model of human cooperation in social dilemmas.
title_sort	model of human cooperation in social dilemmas.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2013
url	https://doaj.org/article/7088cf4002604b30bd7cae03c33b6875
work_keys_str_mv	AT valeriocapraro amodelofhumancooperationinsocialdilemmas AT valeriocapraro modelofhumancooperationinsocialdilemmas
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A model of human cooperation in social dilemmas.

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