A phenomenologically oriented account of the phenomenon of aspectuality in propositional attitudes

My main concern in this paper is to provide an account of the aspectuality of propositional attitudes. After having made the negative point that aspectuality cannot be accounted for in purely semantic terms, I shall maintain that what accounts for aspectuality are phenomenal modes of presentation....

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Autor principal:	Elisabetta Sacchi
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	aspectuality propositional attitudes opacity modes of presentation phenomenal characters consciousness Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/72d4924a91b24a1f8d333bdbc506b830
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:72d4924a91b24a1f8d333bdbc506b830
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:72d4924a91b24a1f8d333bdbc506b8302021-12-02T11:09:37ZA phenomenologically oriented account of the phenomenon of aspectuality in propositional attitudes10.13128/Phe_Mi-196442280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/72d4924a91b24a1f8d333bdbc506b8302016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7052https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 My main concern in this paper is to provide an account of the aspectuality of propositional attitudes. After having made the negative point that aspectuality cannot be accounted for in purely semantic terms, I shall maintain that what accounts for aspectuality are phenomenal modes of presentation. The fundamental difference between my modes of presentation and those employed in the several variants of the standard account of aspectuality is that while the latter are properties (taken to be true) of the objects which are involved in the content, my modes of presentation are properties of the subject’s experience of the objects and in this sense qualify as “subjective”. My thesis is that only phenomenal modes of presentation are suited to account for aspectuality because they incorporate that peculiar way of appearing of the object to the subject which explains whether or not he takes different attitudes towards contents which concern the same object. That modes of presentation have to play this role is an unquestioned point in the debate. That in order to do it they need to have a phenomenal nature is what I shall try to argue for here. Elisabetta SacchiRosenberg & Sellierarticleaspectualitypropositional attitudesopacitymodes of presentationphenomenal charactersconsciousnessAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 1 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	aspectuality propositional attitudes opacity modes of presentation phenomenal characters consciousness Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	aspectuality propositional attitudes opacity modes of presentation phenomenal characters consciousness Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Elisabetta Sacchi A phenomenologically oriented account of the phenomenon of aspectuality in propositional attitudes
description	My main concern in this paper is to provide an account of the aspectuality of propositional attitudes. After having made the negative point that aspectuality cannot be accounted for in purely semantic terms, I shall maintain that what accounts for aspectuality are phenomenal modes of presentation. The fundamental difference between my modes of presentation and those employed in the several variants of the standard account of aspectuality is that while the latter are properties (taken to be true) of the objects which are involved in the content, my modes of presentation are properties of the subject’s experience of the objects and in this sense qualify as “subjective”. My thesis is that only phenomenal modes of presentation are suited to account for aspectuality because they incorporate that peculiar way of appearing of the object to the subject which explains whether or not he takes different attitudes towards contents which concern the same object. That modes of presentation have to play this role is an unquestioned point in the debate. That in order to do it they need to have a phenomenal nature is what I shall try to argue for here.
format	article
author	Elisabetta Sacchi
author_facet	Elisabetta Sacchi
author_sort	Elisabetta Sacchi
title	A phenomenologically oriented account of the phenomenon of aspectuality in propositional attitudes
title_short	A phenomenologically oriented account of the phenomenon of aspectuality in propositional attitudes
title_full	A phenomenologically oriented account of the phenomenon of aspectuality in propositional attitudes
title_fullStr	A phenomenologically oriented account of the phenomenon of aspectuality in propositional attitudes
title_full_unstemmed	A phenomenologically oriented account of the phenomenon of aspectuality in propositional attitudes
title_sort	phenomenologically oriented account of the phenomenon of aspectuality in propositional attitudes
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/72d4924a91b24a1f8d333bdbc506b830
work_keys_str_mv	AT elisabettasacchi aphenomenologicallyorientedaccountofthephenomenonofaspectualityinpropositionalattitudes AT elisabettasacchi phenomenologicallyorientedaccountofthephenomenonofaspectualityinpropositionalattitudes
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A phenomenologically oriented account of the phenomenon of aspectuality in propositional attitudes

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