Evolutionary Game-theoretic Analysis for Residential Users Considering Integrated Demand Response

As an important part of demand side, residential users have the characteristics of imperfect rationality and strong randomness, which are rarely considered in the existing study. Moreover, to effectively improve the energy efficiency, integrated demand response (IDR) is proposed as an effective meas...

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Autores principales:	Bingtuan Gao, Chen Chen, Yanhui Qin, Xiaofeng Liu, Zhenyu Zhu
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	IEEE 2021
Materias:	Contract price evolutionary game intelligent community energy consumption behavior integrated demand response (IDR) Production of electric energy or power. Powerplants. Central stations TK1001-1841 Renewable energy sources TJ807-830
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/73c337eb2de84c34a5e1e62d2b977e7b
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:73c337eb2de84c34a5e1e62d2b977e7b2021-11-27T00:01:36ZEvolutionary Game-theoretic Analysis for Residential Users Considering Integrated Demand Response2196-542010.35833/MPCE.2019.000030https://doaj.org/article/73c337eb2de84c34a5e1e62d2b977e7b2021-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9169981/https://doaj.org/toc/2196-5420As an important part of demand side, residential users have the characteristics of imperfect rationality and strong randomness, which are rarely considered in the existing study. Moreover, to effectively improve the energy efficiency, integrated demand response (IDR) is proposed as an effective measure to reduce the local energy supply pressure. This paper focuses on a scenario for IDR programs, in which the intelligent building aggregator (IBA) wants to encourage residential users to participate in IDR according to a proper contract price policy. To analyze how the participation degree tendency evolves over time, an evolutionary game approach is proposed considering residential users' bounded-rationality. A symmetric evolutionary game model and an asymmetric evolutionary game model are established, and the stability of equilibrium points in the above models is proven. Simulation results show that different contract price policies will obviously influence residential users' strategy, and affect the stable equilibrium points of the evolutionary game. The simulation results provide an effective reference for IBA to set proper and effective price incentives.Bingtuan GaoChen ChenYanhui QinXiaofeng LiuZhenyu ZhuIEEEarticleContract priceevolutionary gameintelligent communityenergy consumption behaviorintegrated demand response (IDR)Production of electric energy or power. Powerplants. Central stationsTK1001-1841Renewable energy sourcesTJ807-830ENJournal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy, Vol 9, Iss 6, Pp 1500-1509 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Contract price evolutionary game intelligent community energy consumption behavior integrated demand response (IDR) Production of electric energy or power. Powerplants. Central stations TK1001-1841 Renewable energy sources TJ807-830
spellingShingle	Contract price evolutionary game intelligent community energy consumption behavior integrated demand response (IDR) Production of electric energy or power. Powerplants. Central stations TK1001-1841 Renewable energy sources TJ807-830 Bingtuan Gao Chen Chen Yanhui Qin Xiaofeng Liu Zhenyu Zhu Evolutionary Game-theoretic Analysis for Residential Users Considering Integrated Demand Response
description	As an important part of demand side, residential users have the characteristics of imperfect rationality and strong randomness, which are rarely considered in the existing study. Moreover, to effectively improve the energy efficiency, integrated demand response (IDR) is proposed as an effective measure to reduce the local energy supply pressure. This paper focuses on a scenario for IDR programs, in which the intelligent building aggregator (IBA) wants to encourage residential users to participate in IDR according to a proper contract price policy. To analyze how the participation degree tendency evolves over time, an evolutionary game approach is proposed considering residential users' bounded-rationality. A symmetric evolutionary game model and an asymmetric evolutionary game model are established, and the stability of equilibrium points in the above models is proven. Simulation results show that different contract price policies will obviously influence residential users' strategy, and affect the stable equilibrium points of the evolutionary game. The simulation results provide an effective reference for IBA to set proper and effective price incentives.
format	article
author	Bingtuan Gao Chen Chen Yanhui Qin Xiaofeng Liu Zhenyu Zhu
author_facet	Bingtuan Gao Chen Chen Yanhui Qin Xiaofeng Liu Zhenyu Zhu
author_sort	Bingtuan Gao
title	Evolutionary Game-theoretic Analysis for Residential Users Considering Integrated Demand Response
title_short	Evolutionary Game-theoretic Analysis for Residential Users Considering Integrated Demand Response
title_full	Evolutionary Game-theoretic Analysis for Residential Users Considering Integrated Demand Response
title_fullStr	Evolutionary Game-theoretic Analysis for Residential Users Considering Integrated Demand Response
title_full_unstemmed	Evolutionary Game-theoretic Analysis for Residential Users Considering Integrated Demand Response
title_sort	evolutionary game-theoretic analysis for residential users considering integrated demand response
publisher	IEEE
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/73c337eb2de84c34a5e1e62d2b977e7b
work_keys_str_mv	AT bingtuangao evolutionarygametheoreticanalysisforresidentialusersconsideringintegrateddemandresponse AT chenchen evolutionarygametheoreticanalysisforresidentialusersconsideringintegrateddemandresponse AT yanhuiqin evolutionarygametheoreticanalysisforresidentialusersconsideringintegrateddemandresponse AT xiaofengliu evolutionarygametheoreticanalysisforresidentialusersconsideringintegrateddemandresponse AT zhenyuzhu evolutionarygametheoreticanalysisforresidentialusersconsideringintegrateddemandresponse
_version_	1718409236987248640

Evolutionary Game-theoretic Analysis for Residential Users Considering Integrated Demand Response

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