Robot Responsibility and Moral Community

It is almost a foregone conclusion that robots cannot be morally responsible agents, both because they lack traditional features of moral agency like consciousness, intentionality, or empathy and because of the apparent senselessness of holding them accountable. Moreover, although some theorists inc...

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Autor principal:	Dane Leigh Gogoshin
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Frontiers Media S.A. 2021
Materias:	moral responsibility artificial moral agency human-robot interaction artificial intelligence accountability structures Mechanical engineering and machinery TJ1-1570 Electronic computers. Computer science QA75.5-76.95
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/7458a8c75b0a41668c93718ff0db0258
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:7458a8c75b0a41668c93718ff0db0258
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:7458a8c75b0a41668c93718ff0db02582021-11-22T08:27:45ZRobot Responsibility and Moral Community2296-914410.3389/frobt.2021.768092https://doaj.org/article/7458a8c75b0a41668c93718ff0db02582021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frobt.2021.768092/fullhttps://doaj.org/toc/2296-9144It is almost a foregone conclusion that robots cannot be morally responsible agents, both because they lack traditional features of moral agency like consciousness, intentionality, or empathy and because of the apparent senselessness of holding them accountable. Moreover, although some theorists include them in the moral community as moral patients, on the Strawsonian picture of moral community as requiring moral responsibility, robots are typically excluded from membership. By looking closely at our actual moral responsibility practices, however, I determine that the agency reflected and cultivated by them is limited to the kind of moral agency of which some robots are capable, not the philosophically demanding sort behind the traditional view. Hence, moral rule-abiding robots (if feasible) can be sufficiently morally responsible and thus moral community members, despite certain deficits. Alternative accountability structures could address these deficits, which I argue ought to be in place for those existing moral community members who share these deficits.Dane Leigh GogoshinFrontiers Media S.A.articlemoral responsibilityartificial moral agencyhuman-robot interactionartificial intelligenceaccountability structuresMechanical engineering and machineryTJ1-1570Electronic computers. Computer scienceQA75.5-76.95ENFrontiers in Robotics and AI, Vol 8 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	moral responsibility artificial moral agency human-robot interaction artificial intelligence accountability structures Mechanical engineering and machinery TJ1-1570 Electronic computers. Computer science QA75.5-76.95
spellingShingle	moral responsibility artificial moral agency human-robot interaction artificial intelligence accountability structures Mechanical engineering and machinery TJ1-1570 Electronic computers. Computer science QA75.5-76.95 Dane Leigh Gogoshin Robot Responsibility and Moral Community
description	It is almost a foregone conclusion that robots cannot be morally responsible agents, both because they lack traditional features of moral agency like consciousness, intentionality, or empathy and because of the apparent senselessness of holding them accountable. Moreover, although some theorists include them in the moral community as moral patients, on the Strawsonian picture of moral community as requiring moral responsibility, robots are typically excluded from membership. By looking closely at our actual moral responsibility practices, however, I determine that the agency reflected and cultivated by them is limited to the kind of moral agency of which some robots are capable, not the philosophically demanding sort behind the traditional view. Hence, moral rule-abiding robots (if feasible) can be sufficiently morally responsible and thus moral community members, despite certain deficits. Alternative accountability structures could address these deficits, which I argue ought to be in place for those existing moral community members who share these deficits.
format	article
author	Dane Leigh Gogoshin
author_facet	Dane Leigh Gogoshin
author_sort	Dane Leigh Gogoshin
title	Robot Responsibility and Moral Community
title_short	Robot Responsibility and Moral Community
title_full	Robot Responsibility and Moral Community
title_fullStr	Robot Responsibility and Moral Community
title_full_unstemmed	Robot Responsibility and Moral Community
title_sort	robot responsibility and moral community
publisher	Frontiers Media S.A.
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/7458a8c75b0a41668c93718ff0db0258
work_keys_str_mv	AT daneleighgogoshin robotresponsibilityandmoralcommunity
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Robot Responsibility and Moral Community

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