The relative effectiveness of law enforcement policies aimed at reducing illegal trade: Evidence from laboratory markets.

Despite recent emphasis and implementation of national and international anti-money laundering policies, illegal product markets, and their associated illicit profit remain a global problem. In addition to law enforcement aimed at reducing money-laundering, enforcement also takes place during (1) th...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Chian Jones Ritten, Christopher Bastian, Owen Phillips
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2021
Materias:
R
Q
Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/7535b7e3ca7c4d93a854b6a62fae5865
Etiquetas: Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
id oai:doaj.org-article:7535b7e3ca7c4d93a854b6a62fae5865
record_format dspace
spelling oai:doaj.org-article:7535b7e3ca7c4d93a854b6a62fae58652021-12-02T20:04:32ZThe relative effectiveness of law enforcement policies aimed at reducing illegal trade: Evidence from laboratory markets.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0259254https://doaj.org/article/7535b7e3ca7c4d93a854b6a62fae58652021-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0259254https://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203Despite recent emphasis and implementation of national and international anti-money laundering policies, illegal product markets, and their associated illicit profit remain a global problem. In addition to law enforcement aimed at reducing money-laundering, enforcement also takes place during (1) the production (e.g. crop eradication) and (2) sale (e.g. seizure of products during transportation that interrupts buyer and seller transactions) of the illegal product. Since funds for enforcement come from limited budgets, understanding where in this production-trade-laundering cycle law enforcement is most impactful becomes a global question. Using laboratory experimental markets and a seizure rate of 20%, we find that law enforcement focused on seizing laundered profits does little to reduce illegal market activity when compared to no law enforcement, suggesting that focusing law enforcement on money laundering will likely be ineffective at reducing crime. Results further show the amount of illicit trade is nearly 32% lower when law enforcement is focused at the point of sale, and there may be additional economic incentives that reduce illicit trade in the long run when compared to no law enforcement. Enforcement at the point of production also reduces market activity, but not as effectively as enforcement at the point of sale. Lastly, the empirical findings deviate from equilibrium predictions, suggesting law enforcement policy based on theory alone may lead to inefficient allocation of limited law enforcement resources.Chian Jones RittenChristopher BastianOwen PhillipsPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 16, Iss 11, p e0259254 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic Medicine
R
Science
Q
spellingShingle Medicine
R
Science
Q
Chian Jones Ritten
Christopher Bastian
Owen Phillips
The relative effectiveness of law enforcement policies aimed at reducing illegal trade: Evidence from laboratory markets.
description Despite recent emphasis and implementation of national and international anti-money laundering policies, illegal product markets, and their associated illicit profit remain a global problem. In addition to law enforcement aimed at reducing money-laundering, enforcement also takes place during (1) the production (e.g. crop eradication) and (2) sale (e.g. seizure of products during transportation that interrupts buyer and seller transactions) of the illegal product. Since funds for enforcement come from limited budgets, understanding where in this production-trade-laundering cycle law enforcement is most impactful becomes a global question. Using laboratory experimental markets and a seizure rate of 20%, we find that law enforcement focused on seizing laundered profits does little to reduce illegal market activity when compared to no law enforcement, suggesting that focusing law enforcement on money laundering will likely be ineffective at reducing crime. Results further show the amount of illicit trade is nearly 32% lower when law enforcement is focused at the point of sale, and there may be additional economic incentives that reduce illicit trade in the long run when compared to no law enforcement. Enforcement at the point of production also reduces market activity, but not as effectively as enforcement at the point of sale. Lastly, the empirical findings deviate from equilibrium predictions, suggesting law enforcement policy based on theory alone may lead to inefficient allocation of limited law enforcement resources.
format article
author Chian Jones Ritten
Christopher Bastian
Owen Phillips
author_facet Chian Jones Ritten
Christopher Bastian
Owen Phillips
author_sort Chian Jones Ritten
title The relative effectiveness of law enforcement policies aimed at reducing illegal trade: Evidence from laboratory markets.
title_short The relative effectiveness of law enforcement policies aimed at reducing illegal trade: Evidence from laboratory markets.
title_full The relative effectiveness of law enforcement policies aimed at reducing illegal trade: Evidence from laboratory markets.
title_fullStr The relative effectiveness of law enforcement policies aimed at reducing illegal trade: Evidence from laboratory markets.
title_full_unstemmed The relative effectiveness of law enforcement policies aimed at reducing illegal trade: Evidence from laboratory markets.
title_sort relative effectiveness of law enforcement policies aimed at reducing illegal trade: evidence from laboratory markets.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/7535b7e3ca7c4d93a854b6a62fae5865
work_keys_str_mv AT chianjonesritten therelativeeffectivenessoflawenforcementpoliciesaimedatreducingillegaltradeevidencefromlaboratorymarkets
AT christopherbastian therelativeeffectivenessoflawenforcementpoliciesaimedatreducingillegaltradeevidencefromlaboratorymarkets
AT owenphillips therelativeeffectivenessoflawenforcementpoliciesaimedatreducingillegaltradeevidencefromlaboratorymarkets
AT chianjonesritten relativeeffectivenessoflawenforcementpoliciesaimedatreducingillegaltradeevidencefromlaboratorymarkets
AT christopherbastian relativeeffectivenessoflawenforcementpoliciesaimedatreducingillegaltradeevidencefromlaboratorymarkets
AT owenphillips relativeeffectivenessoflawenforcementpoliciesaimedatreducingillegaltradeevidencefromlaboratorymarkets
_version_ 1718375549426991104