The Methods of Ethics
The paper begins with an account of the intellectual background to Henry Sidgwick’s writing of his Methods of Ethics and an analysis of what Sidgwick meant by a ‘method’. His broad distinction between three main ethical theories – egoism, consequentialism, and deontology – is elucidated and accepte...
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2019
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oai:doaj.org-article:7771be9aa69646b9ada466887454aff12021-12-02T09:29:57ZThe Methods of Ethics10.13128/Phe_Mi-249712280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/7771be9aa69646b9ada466887454aff12019-03-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7322https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 The paper begins with an account of the intellectual background to Henry Sidgwick’s writing of his Methods of Ethics and an analysis of what Sidgwick meant by a ‘method’. His broad distinction between three main ethical theories – egoism, consequentialism, and deontology – is elucidated and accepted. Sidgwick’s different forms of intuitionism are explained, as are his criteria for testing the ‘certainty’ of a potentially self-evident belief. Section 3 discusses dogmatic intuitionism (common-sense morality systematized) and Sidgwick’s own view, in the light of his requirement for precision in ethics. The final section concerns the implications of Sidgwick’s position on disagreement for ethical theory. It is suggested that we have some knowledge in ethics, on which most converge, but not much. The paper concludes with a recommendation for a more eirenic and less dogmatic approach to philosophical ethics. Roger CrispRosenberg & SellierarticleHenry Sidgwickethical methodologyethical intuitionismmoral disagreementAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 15 (2019) |
| institution |
DOAJ |
| collection |
DOAJ |
| language |
EN FR IT |
| topic |
Henry Sidgwick ethical methodology ethical intuitionism moral disagreement Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 |
| spellingShingle |
Henry Sidgwick ethical methodology ethical intuitionism moral disagreement Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Roger Crisp The Methods of Ethics |
| description |
The paper begins with an account of the intellectual background to Henry Sidgwick’s writing of his Methods of Ethics and an analysis of what Sidgwick meant by a ‘method’. His broad distinction between three main ethical theories – egoism, consequentialism, and deontology – is elucidated and accepted. Sidgwick’s different forms of intuitionism are explained, as are his criteria for testing the ‘certainty’ of a potentially self-evident belief. Section 3 discusses dogmatic intuitionism (common-sense morality systematized) and Sidgwick’s own view, in the light of his requirement for precision in ethics. The final section concerns the implications of Sidgwick’s position on disagreement for ethical theory. It is suggested that we have some knowledge in ethics, on which most converge, but not much. The paper concludes with a recommendation for a more eirenic and less dogmatic approach to philosophical ethics.
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| format |
article |
| author |
Roger Crisp |
| author_facet |
Roger Crisp |
| author_sort |
Roger Crisp |
| title |
The Methods of Ethics |
| title_short |
The Methods of Ethics |
| title_full |
The Methods of Ethics |
| title_fullStr |
The Methods of Ethics |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Methods of Ethics |
| title_sort |
methods of ethics |
| publisher |
Rosenberg & Sellier |
| publishDate |
2019 |
| url |
https://doaj.org/article/7771be9aa69646b9ada466887454aff1 |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT rogercrisp themethodsofethics AT rogercrisp methodsofethics |
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