The Lessons of Asilomar and the H5N1 “Affair”

ABSTRACT In mid-1974, soon after the first recombinant DNA molecules were replicated in Escherichia coli, scientists called for, and observed, a voluntary moratorium on certain experiments. One goal of the moratorium was to hold a conference (Asilomar) to evaluate the risks, if any, of this new tech...

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Autor principal:	Stanley Falkow
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	American Society for Microbiology 2012
Materias:	Microbiology QR1-502
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/785ec124a2d44d43a5bc8ecdbf1db73c
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:785ec124a2d44d43a5bc8ecdbf1db73c2021-11-15T15:39:13ZThe Lessons of Asilomar and the H5N1 “Affair”10.1128/mBio.00354-122150-7511https://doaj.org/article/785ec124a2d44d43a5bc8ecdbf1db73c2012-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://journals.asm.org/doi/10.1128/mBio.00354-12https://doaj.org/toc/2150-7511ABSTRACT In mid-1974, soon after the first recombinant DNA molecules were replicated in Escherichia coli, scientists called for, and observed, a voluntary moratorium on certain experiments. One goal of the moratorium was to hold a conference (Asilomar) to evaluate the risks, if any, of this new technology. The Asilomar conference concluded that recombinant DNA research should proceed but under strict guidelines. The furor surrounding the recent genetic manipulation of the transmissibility of avian influenza virus H5N1 led to a short-term moratorium that has been extended indefinitely. The question is how long should the moratorium remain in place, or should it be permanent? Voltaire observed, “History never repeats itself; man always does.” I believe the parallels of Asilomar can be applied to the problem facing biomedical science today. We should move forward to establish standardized guidelines, using common sense and scientific creativity. The onus of responsibility falls on the individual scientist and involves the education of a new generation of scientists into the social and ethical implications of genetic engineering in a new age of genomics and synthetic biology. In addition, scientists who work with infectious agents must deal not only with biosafety but also, alas, with bioterrorism. The H5N1 “affair” is not a question of freedom of inquiry or the dissemination of scientific research; it is a question of the social responsibility of science and scientists to ensure that the public understands why this work is beneficial and worthwhile.Stanley FalkowAmerican Society for MicrobiologyarticleMicrobiologyQR1-502ENmBio, Vol 3, Iss 5 (2012)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Microbiology QR1-502
spellingShingle	Microbiology QR1-502 Stanley Falkow The Lessons of Asilomar and the H5N1 “Affair”
description	ABSTRACT In mid-1974, soon after the first recombinant DNA molecules were replicated in Escherichia coli, scientists called for, and observed, a voluntary moratorium on certain experiments. One goal of the moratorium was to hold a conference (Asilomar) to evaluate the risks, if any, of this new technology. The Asilomar conference concluded that recombinant DNA research should proceed but under strict guidelines. The furor surrounding the recent genetic manipulation of the transmissibility of avian influenza virus H5N1 led to a short-term moratorium that has been extended indefinitely. The question is how long should the moratorium remain in place, or should it be permanent? Voltaire observed, “History never repeats itself; man always does.” I believe the parallels of Asilomar can be applied to the problem facing biomedical science today. We should move forward to establish standardized guidelines, using common sense and scientific creativity. The onus of responsibility falls on the individual scientist and involves the education of a new generation of scientists into the social and ethical implications of genetic engineering in a new age of genomics and synthetic biology. In addition, scientists who work with infectious agents must deal not only with biosafety but also, alas, with bioterrorism. The H5N1 “affair” is not a question of freedom of inquiry or the dissemination of scientific research; it is a question of the social responsibility of science and scientists to ensure that the public understands why this work is beneficial and worthwhile.
format	article
author	Stanley Falkow
author_facet	Stanley Falkow
author_sort	Stanley Falkow
title	The Lessons of Asilomar and the H5N1 “Affair”
title_short	The Lessons of Asilomar and the H5N1 “Affair”
title_full	The Lessons of Asilomar and the H5N1 “Affair”
title_fullStr	The Lessons of Asilomar and the H5N1 “Affair”
title_full_unstemmed	The Lessons of Asilomar and the H5N1 “Affair”
title_sort	lessons of asilomar and the h5n1 “affair”
publisher	American Society for Microbiology
publishDate	2012
url	https://doaj.org/article/785ec124a2d44d43a5bc8ecdbf1db73c
work_keys_str_mv	AT stanleyfalkow thelessonsofasilomarandtheh5n1affair AT stanleyfalkow lessonsofasilomarandtheh5n1affair
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The Lessons of Asilomar and the H5N1 “Affair”

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