The Social Impact Theory of Law

Margaret Gilbert’s work on sociality covers a wide range of topics, and as she puts it “addresses matters of great significance to several philosophical specialties – including ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of law – and outside philosophy as well”...

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Autor principal:	Joshua Keton
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	legal normativity Hart-Dworkin debate legal positivism interpretivism Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/78b0d192c8bf4f0388a1ba5d26161bc4
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:78b0d192c8bf4f0388a1ba5d26161bc4
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:78b0d192c8bf4f0388a1ba5d26161bc42021-12-02T10:38:58ZThe Social Impact Theory of Law10.13128/Phe_Mi-181582280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/78b0d192c8bf4f0388a1ba5d26161bc42016-04-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7220https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 Margaret Gilbert’s work on sociality covers a wide range of topics, and as she puts it “addresses matters of great significance to several philosophical specialties – including ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of law – and outside philosophy as well” (Gilbert 2013, p. 1). Herein I argue that Mark Greenberg’s recent call to eliminate the problem of legal normativity is well motivated. Further, I argue that Gilbert’s work on joint commitment, and more specifically obligations of joint commitment, allows us to move beyond the problem of legal normativity while cashing out H.L.A. Hart’s thesis that moral and legal obligations are distinct. Joshua KetonRosenberg & Sellierarticlelegal normativityHart-Dworkin debatelegal positivisminterpretivismAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 9 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	legal normativity Hart-Dworkin debate legal positivism interpretivism Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	legal normativity Hart-Dworkin debate legal positivism interpretivism Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Joshua Keton The Social Impact Theory of Law
description	Margaret Gilbert’s work on sociality covers a wide range of topics, and as she puts it “addresses matters of great significance to several philosophical specialties – including ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of law – and outside philosophy as well” (Gilbert 2013, p. 1). Herein I argue that Mark Greenberg’s recent call to eliminate the problem of legal normativity is well motivated. Further, I argue that Gilbert’s work on joint commitment, and more specifically obligations of joint commitment, allows us to move beyond the problem of legal normativity while cashing out H.L.A. Hart’s thesis that moral and legal obligations are distinct.
format	article
author	Joshua Keton
author_facet	Joshua Keton
author_sort	Joshua Keton
title	The Social Impact Theory of Law
title_short	The Social Impact Theory of Law
title_full	The Social Impact Theory of Law
title_fullStr	The Social Impact Theory of Law
title_full_unstemmed	The Social Impact Theory of Law
title_sort	social impact theory of law
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/78b0d192c8bf4f0388a1ba5d26161bc4
work_keys_str_mv	AT joshuaketon thesocialimpacttheoryoflaw AT joshuaketon socialimpacttheoryoflaw
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The Social Impact Theory of Law

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