Feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution

Abstract Recently, to bridge the gap between security of Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) and a high key rate, a novel protocol, the so-called detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-QKD), has been independently proposed by several groups and has attracted great interes...

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Autores principales: Kejin Wei, Hongwei Liu, Haiqiang Ma, Xiuqing Yang, Yong Zhang, Yongmei Sun, Jinghua Xiao, Yuefeng Ji
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Publicado: Nature Portfolio 2017
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/78fb786e2cac45718b6dcea013a730ed
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:78fb786e2cac45718b6dcea013a730ed2021-12-02T16:06:34ZFeasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution10.1038/s41598-017-00531-y2045-2322https://doaj.org/article/78fb786e2cac45718b6dcea013a730ed2017-03-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-00531-yhttps://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Recently, to bridge the gap between security of Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) and a high key rate, a novel protocol, the so-called detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-QKD), has been independently proposed by several groups and has attracted great interest. A higher key rate is obtained, since a single photon bell state measurement (BSM) setup is applied to DDI-QKD. Subsequently, Qi has proposed two attacks for this protocol. However, the first attack, in which Bob’s BSM setup is assumed to be completely a “black box”, is easily prevented by using some additional monitoring devices or by specifically characterizing the BSM. The second attack, which combines the blinding attack and the detector wavelength-dependent efficiency, is not explicitly discussed, and its feasibility is not experimentally confirmed. Here, we show that the second attack is not technically viable because of an intrinsically wavelength-dependent property of a realistic beam splitter, which is an essential component in DDI-QKD. Moreover, we propose a feasible attack that combines a well-known attack—detector blinding attack with intrinsic imperfections of single-photon detectors. The experimental measurement and proof-of-principle test results confirm that our attack can allow Eve to get a copy of quantum keys without being detected and that it is feasible with current technology.Kejin WeiHongwei LiuHaiqiang MaXiuqing YangYong ZhangYongmei SunJinghua XiaoYuefeng JiNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 7, Iss 1, Pp 1-8 (2017)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic Medicine
R
Science
Q
spellingShingle Medicine
R
Science
Q
Kejin Wei
Hongwei Liu
Haiqiang Ma
Xiuqing Yang
Yong Zhang
Yongmei Sun
Jinghua Xiao
Yuefeng Ji
Feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution
description Abstract Recently, to bridge the gap between security of Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) and a high key rate, a novel protocol, the so-called detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-QKD), has been independently proposed by several groups and has attracted great interest. A higher key rate is obtained, since a single photon bell state measurement (BSM) setup is applied to DDI-QKD. Subsequently, Qi has proposed two attacks for this protocol. However, the first attack, in which Bob’s BSM setup is assumed to be completely a “black box”, is easily prevented by using some additional monitoring devices or by specifically characterizing the BSM. The second attack, which combines the blinding attack and the detector wavelength-dependent efficiency, is not explicitly discussed, and its feasibility is not experimentally confirmed. Here, we show that the second attack is not technically viable because of an intrinsically wavelength-dependent property of a realistic beam splitter, which is an essential component in DDI-QKD. Moreover, we propose a feasible attack that combines a well-known attack—detector blinding attack with intrinsic imperfections of single-photon detectors. The experimental measurement and proof-of-principle test results confirm that our attack can allow Eve to get a copy of quantum keys without being detected and that it is feasible with current technology.
format article
author Kejin Wei
Hongwei Liu
Haiqiang Ma
Xiuqing Yang
Yong Zhang
Yongmei Sun
Jinghua Xiao
Yuefeng Ji
author_facet Kejin Wei
Hongwei Liu
Haiqiang Ma
Xiuqing Yang
Yong Zhang
Yongmei Sun
Jinghua Xiao
Yuefeng Ji
author_sort Kejin Wei
title Feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution
title_short Feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution
title_full Feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution
title_fullStr Feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution
title_full_unstemmed Feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution
title_sort feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution
publisher Nature Portfolio
publishDate 2017
url https://doaj.org/article/78fb786e2cac45718b6dcea013a730ed
work_keys_str_mv AT kejinwei feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution
AT hongweiliu feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution
AT haiqiangma feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution
AT xiuqingyang feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution
AT yongzhang feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution
AT yongmeisun feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution
AT jinghuaxiao feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution
AT yuefengji feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution
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