Feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution
Abstract Recently, to bridge the gap between security of Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) and a high key rate, a novel protocol, the so-called detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-QKD), has been independently proposed by several groups and has attracted great interes...
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2017
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oai:doaj.org-article:78fb786e2cac45718b6dcea013a730ed2021-12-02T16:06:34ZFeasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution10.1038/s41598-017-00531-y2045-2322https://doaj.org/article/78fb786e2cac45718b6dcea013a730ed2017-03-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-00531-yhttps://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Recently, to bridge the gap between security of Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) and a high key rate, a novel protocol, the so-called detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-QKD), has been independently proposed by several groups and has attracted great interest. A higher key rate is obtained, since a single photon bell state measurement (BSM) setup is applied to DDI-QKD. Subsequently, Qi has proposed two attacks for this protocol. However, the first attack, in which Bob’s BSM setup is assumed to be completely a “black box”, is easily prevented by using some additional monitoring devices or by specifically characterizing the BSM. The second attack, which combines the blinding attack and the detector wavelength-dependent efficiency, is not explicitly discussed, and its feasibility is not experimentally confirmed. Here, we show that the second attack is not technically viable because of an intrinsically wavelength-dependent property of a realistic beam splitter, which is an essential component in DDI-QKD. Moreover, we propose a feasible attack that combines a well-known attack—detector blinding attack with intrinsic imperfections of single-photon detectors. The experimental measurement and proof-of-principle test results confirm that our attack can allow Eve to get a copy of quantum keys without being detected and that it is feasible with current technology.Kejin WeiHongwei LiuHaiqiang MaXiuqing YangYong ZhangYongmei SunJinghua XiaoYuefeng JiNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 7, Iss 1, Pp 1-8 (2017) |
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Medicine R Science Q Kejin Wei Hongwei Liu Haiqiang Ma Xiuqing Yang Yong Zhang Yongmei Sun Jinghua Xiao Yuefeng Ji Feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution |
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Abstract Recently, to bridge the gap between security of Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) and a high key rate, a novel protocol, the so-called detector-device-independent QKD (DDI-QKD), has been independently proposed by several groups and has attracted great interest. A higher key rate is obtained, since a single photon bell state measurement (BSM) setup is applied to DDI-QKD. Subsequently, Qi has proposed two attacks for this protocol. However, the first attack, in which Bob’s BSM setup is assumed to be completely a “black box”, is easily prevented by using some additional monitoring devices or by specifically characterizing the BSM. The second attack, which combines the blinding attack and the detector wavelength-dependent efficiency, is not explicitly discussed, and its feasibility is not experimentally confirmed. Here, we show that the second attack is not technically viable because of an intrinsically wavelength-dependent property of a realistic beam splitter, which is an essential component in DDI-QKD. Moreover, we propose a feasible attack that combines a well-known attack—detector blinding attack with intrinsic imperfections of single-photon detectors. The experimental measurement and proof-of-principle test results confirm that our attack can allow Eve to get a copy of quantum keys without being detected and that it is feasible with current technology. |
format |
article |
author |
Kejin Wei Hongwei Liu Haiqiang Ma Xiuqing Yang Yong Zhang Yongmei Sun Jinghua Xiao Yuefeng Ji |
author_facet |
Kejin Wei Hongwei Liu Haiqiang Ma Xiuqing Yang Yong Zhang Yongmei Sun Jinghua Xiao Yuefeng Ji |
author_sort |
Kejin Wei |
title |
Feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution |
title_short |
Feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution |
title_full |
Feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution |
title_fullStr |
Feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution |
title_full_unstemmed |
Feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution |
title_sort |
feasible attack on detector-device-independent quantum key distribution |
publisher |
Nature Portfolio |
publishDate |
2017 |
url |
https://doaj.org/article/78fb786e2cac45718b6dcea013a730ed |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT kejinwei feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution AT hongweiliu feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution AT haiqiangma feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution AT xiuqingyang feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution AT yongzhang feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution AT yongmeisun feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution AT jinghuaxiao feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution AT yuefengji feasibleattackondetectordeviceindependentquantumkeydistribution |
_version_ |
1718384969922904064 |