Comparative Analysis of Government Subsidy Policies in a Dynamic Green Supply Chain Considering Consumers Preference

Governments formulate different subsidy policies to incentivize manufacturers to produce green products, and these policies may have different subsidy effects. The purpose of this study is to compare and analyze the dynamic effects of different subsidy policies to the manufacturer in a green supply...

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Autores principales: Chao Lu, Weilai Huang, Haifang Cheng
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Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: MDPI AG 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/798b45f246bb4f1eb81627363b3371ec
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:798b45f246bb4f1eb81627363b3371ec2021-11-11T19:21:48ZComparative Analysis of Government Subsidy Policies in a Dynamic Green Supply Chain Considering Consumers Preference10.3390/su1321116012071-1050https://doaj.org/article/798b45f246bb4f1eb81627363b3371ec2021-10-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/21/11601https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050Governments formulate different subsidy policies to incentivize manufacturers to produce green products, and these policies may have different subsidy effects. The purpose of this study is to compare and analyze the dynamic effects of different subsidy policies to the manufacturer in a green supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. Three differential game models, considering the consumers preference, are established under three subsidy policies, and the corresponding optimal equilibrium strategies of the supply chain members are analyzed. An example is used to compare the effects of the three policies under the equal government subsidy expenditure. The study finds that the rankings of indexes to evaluate steady-state subsidy effects under the different subsidy policies are time invariant, and the government can preliminarily evaluate these policies according to different subsidy goals. The rankings of indexes to evaluate phased subsidy effects under these policies are time varying. If both subsidy effects and subsidy efficiencies in steady state are taken into account, the optimal selection paths of subsidy policies in the whole period can be obtained. The subsidy effects of the same policy are amplified under the condition of equal steady-state subsidy expenditure, but the rankings of effect indexes under the different subsidy policies are not affected.Chao LuWeilai HuangHaifang ChengMDPI AGarticlegreen supply chaingovernment subsidygreen degreedifferential gameconsumers preferenceEnvironmental effects of industries and plantsTD194-195Renewable energy sourcesTJ807-830Environmental sciencesGE1-350ENSustainability, Vol 13, Iss 11601, p 11601 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic green supply chain
government subsidy
green degree
differential game
consumers preference
Environmental effects of industries and plants
TD194-195
Renewable energy sources
TJ807-830
Environmental sciences
GE1-350
spellingShingle green supply chain
government subsidy
green degree
differential game
consumers preference
Environmental effects of industries and plants
TD194-195
Renewable energy sources
TJ807-830
Environmental sciences
GE1-350
Chao Lu
Weilai Huang
Haifang Cheng
Comparative Analysis of Government Subsidy Policies in a Dynamic Green Supply Chain Considering Consumers Preference
description Governments formulate different subsidy policies to incentivize manufacturers to produce green products, and these policies may have different subsidy effects. The purpose of this study is to compare and analyze the dynamic effects of different subsidy policies to the manufacturer in a green supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. Three differential game models, considering the consumers preference, are established under three subsidy policies, and the corresponding optimal equilibrium strategies of the supply chain members are analyzed. An example is used to compare the effects of the three policies under the equal government subsidy expenditure. The study finds that the rankings of indexes to evaluate steady-state subsidy effects under the different subsidy policies are time invariant, and the government can preliminarily evaluate these policies according to different subsidy goals. The rankings of indexes to evaluate phased subsidy effects under these policies are time varying. If both subsidy effects and subsidy efficiencies in steady state are taken into account, the optimal selection paths of subsidy policies in the whole period can be obtained. The subsidy effects of the same policy are amplified under the condition of equal steady-state subsidy expenditure, but the rankings of effect indexes under the different subsidy policies are not affected.
format article
author Chao Lu
Weilai Huang
Haifang Cheng
author_facet Chao Lu
Weilai Huang
Haifang Cheng
author_sort Chao Lu
title Comparative Analysis of Government Subsidy Policies in a Dynamic Green Supply Chain Considering Consumers Preference
title_short Comparative Analysis of Government Subsidy Policies in a Dynamic Green Supply Chain Considering Consumers Preference
title_full Comparative Analysis of Government Subsidy Policies in a Dynamic Green Supply Chain Considering Consumers Preference
title_fullStr Comparative Analysis of Government Subsidy Policies in a Dynamic Green Supply Chain Considering Consumers Preference
title_full_unstemmed Comparative Analysis of Government Subsidy Policies in a Dynamic Green Supply Chain Considering Consumers Preference
title_sort comparative analysis of government subsidy policies in a dynamic green supply chain considering consumers preference
publisher MDPI AG
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/798b45f246bb4f1eb81627363b3371ec
work_keys_str_mv AT chaolu comparativeanalysisofgovernmentsubsidypoliciesinadynamicgreensupplychainconsideringconsumerspreference
AT weilaihuang comparativeanalysisofgovernmentsubsidypoliciesinadynamicgreensupplychainconsideringconsumerspreference
AT haifangcheng comparativeanalysisofgovernmentsubsidypoliciesinadynamicgreensupplychainconsideringconsumerspreference
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