How Not to Argue about the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and 4E Cognition

In theories of cognition, 4E approaches to cognition are seen to refrain from employing robust representations in contrast to Predictive Process, where such posits are utilized extensively. Despite this notable dissimilarity with regard to pos-its they employ in explaining certain cognitive phenomen...

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Autor principal:	Yavuz Recep Başoğlu
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	CS EN SK
Publicado:	Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences 2021
Materias:	4e cognition embodied cognition free-energy principle mental representation predictive processing representation wars Philosophy (General) B1-5802
Acceso en línea:	https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28402 https://doaj.org/article/7e01d542157b4dc096b6961bc3e2f358
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:7e01d542157b4dc096b6961bc3e2f3582021-12-02T17:41:12ZHow Not to Argue about the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and 4E Cognitionhttps://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.284021335-06682585-7150https://doaj.org/article/7e01d542157b4dc096b6961bc3e2f3582021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/11292246orgf.2021.28402.pdfhttps://doaj.org/toc/1335-0668https://doaj.org/toc/2585-7150In theories of cognition, 4E approaches to cognition are seen to refrain from employing robust representations in contrast to Predictive Process, where such posits are utilized extensively. Despite this notable dissimilarity with regard to pos-its they employ in explaining certain cognitive phenomena, it has been repeatedly argued that they are in fact compatible. As one may expect, these arguments mostly end up contending either that Predictive Process is actually nonrepresentational or that 4E approaches are representational. In this paper, I will argue that such arguments are inadequate for the indicated purpose for several reasons: the variety of representational posits in Predictive Process, the diverse attitudes of practitioners of 4E approaches toward representations and the unconstrained use of the term “representation” in cognitive science. Hence, here I will try to demonstrate that any single argument, if it depends on representational 4E approaches or nonrepresentational Predictive Process, falls short of encompassing this heterogeneity in pertinent debates. Then, I will analyze similar arguments provided by Jacob Hohwy and Michael Kirchhoff to illustrate how destructive this seemingly ordinary criticism is.Yavuz Recep BaşoğluInstitute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciencesarticle4e cognitionembodied cognitionfree-energy principlemental representationpredictive processingrepresentation warsPhilosophy (General)B1-5802CSENSKOrganon F, Vol 28, Iss 4, Pp 777-801 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	CS EN SK
topic	4e cognition embodied cognition free-energy principle mental representation predictive processing representation wars Philosophy (General) B1-5802
spellingShingle	4e cognition embodied cognition free-energy principle mental representation predictive processing representation wars Philosophy (General) B1-5802 Yavuz Recep Başoğlu How Not to Argue about the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and 4E Cognition
description	In theories of cognition, 4E approaches to cognition are seen to refrain from employing robust representations in contrast to Predictive Process, where such posits are utilized extensively. Despite this notable dissimilarity with regard to pos-its they employ in explaining certain cognitive phenomena, it has been repeatedly argued that they are in fact compatible. As one may expect, these arguments mostly end up contending either that Predictive Process is actually nonrepresentational or that 4E approaches are representational. In this paper, I will argue that such arguments are inadequate for the indicated purpose for several reasons: the variety of representational posits in Predictive Process, the diverse attitudes of practitioners of 4E approaches toward representations and the unconstrained use of the term “representation” in cognitive science. Hence, here I will try to demonstrate that any single argument, if it depends on representational 4E approaches or nonrepresentational Predictive Process, falls short of encompassing this heterogeneity in pertinent debates. Then, I will analyze similar arguments provided by Jacob Hohwy and Michael Kirchhoff to illustrate how destructive this seemingly ordinary criticism is.
format	article
author	Yavuz Recep Başoğlu
author_facet	Yavuz Recep Başoğlu
author_sort	Yavuz Recep Başoğlu
title	How Not to Argue about the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and 4E Cognition
title_short	How Not to Argue about the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and 4E Cognition
title_full	How Not to Argue about the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and 4E Cognition
title_fullStr	How Not to Argue about the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and 4E Cognition
title_full_unstemmed	How Not to Argue about the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and 4E Cognition
title_sort	how not to argue about the compatibility of predictive processing and 4e cognition
publisher	Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
publishDate	2021
url	https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28402 https://doaj.org/article/7e01d542157b4dc096b6961bc3e2f358
work_keys_str_mv	AT yavuzrecepbasoglu hownottoargueaboutthecompatibilityofpredictiveprocessingand4ecognition
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How Not to Argue about the Compatibility of Predictive Processing and 4E Cognition

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