Building resilient medical technology supply chains with a software bill of materials

Abstract An exploited vulnerability in a single software component of healthcare technology can affect patient care. The risk of including third-party software components in healthcare technologies can be managed, in part, by leveraging a software bill of materials (SBOM). Analogous to an ingredient...

Description complète

Enregistré dans:
Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux: Seth Carmody, Andrea Coravos, Ginny Fahs, Audra Hatch, Janine Medina, Beau Woods, Joshua Corman
Format: article
Langue:EN
Publié: Nature Portfolio 2021
Sujets:
Accès en ligne:https://doaj.org/article/7e1d28530dc643d8a252c9ea41c7ec0a
Tags: Ajouter un tag
Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!
Description
Résumé:Abstract An exploited vulnerability in a single software component of healthcare technology can affect patient care. The risk of including third-party software components in healthcare technologies can be managed, in part, by leveraging a software bill of materials (SBOM). Analogous to an ingredients list on food packaging, an SBOM is a list of all included software components. SBOMs provide a transparency mechanism for securing software product supply chains by enabling faster identification and remediation of vulnerabilities, towards the goal of reducing the feasibility of attacks. SBOMs have the potential to benefit all supply chain stakeholders of medical technologies without significantly increasing software production costs. Increasing transparency unlocks and enables trustworthy, resilient, and safer healthcare technologies for all.