Economics of paternalism: the hidden costs of self-commanding strategies

The paper proposes an economic assessment of paternalism by comparing different alternative responses to dynamically inconsistent behaviors consecutive to hyperbolic discounting. Two main types of action are possible, self-commanding strategies and paternalism The first category includes personal ru...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal:	Christophe Salvat
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	DE EN FR
Publicado:	Editura ASE Bucuresti 2015
Materias:	libertarian paternalism personal rules nudges self-confidence Economics as a science HB71-74
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/7eb3c26408164b33a64f2ad5c3ddec4c
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:7eb3c26408164b33a64f2ad5c3ddec4c
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:7eb3c26408164b33a64f2ad5c3ddec4c2021-12-02T01:18:12ZEconomics of paternalism: the hidden costs of self-commanding strategies1843-22981844-8208https://doaj.org/article/7eb3c26408164b33a64f2ad5c3ddec4c2015-11-01T00:00:00Z http://jpe.ro/pdf.php?id=7306 https://doaj.org/toc/1843-2298https://doaj.org/toc/1844-8208The paper proposes an economic assessment of paternalism by comparing different alternative responses to dynamically inconsistent behaviors consecutive to hyperbolic discounting. Two main types of action are possible, self-commanding strategies and paternalism The first category includes personal rules and pre-commitment The second can be subcategorized between coercive and non-coercive forms of paternalism, which are respectively associated (although it is debatable) with legal paternalism and with ‘nudges’. Despite being self-inflicted, self-commanding strategies are actually not cost free and can result in a dramatic cutback of people’s freedom of choice. Likewise, legal paternalism can, on occasion, be less harmful than personal rules or pre-commitment; similarly, nudges can be more invasive and less effective than their proponents want us to believe. The aim of this paper is not to propose any standardized form of response to irrational behavior (whatever that may mean) but to argue, on the contrary, that every case should be individually appraised. Individual situations can be remedied by self-commanding strategies or by paternalistic policies, either in isolation or in combination.Christophe SalvatEditura ASE Bucurestiarticlelibertarian paternalismpersonal rulesnudgesself-confidenceEconomics as a scienceHB71-74DEENFRJournal of Philosophical Economics, Vol IX, Iss 1, Pp 102-124 (2015)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	DE EN FR
topic	libertarian paternalism personal rules nudges self-confidence Economics as a science HB71-74
spellingShingle	libertarian paternalism personal rules nudges self-confidence Economics as a science HB71-74 Christophe Salvat Economics of paternalism: the hidden costs of self-commanding strategies
description	The paper proposes an economic assessment of paternalism by comparing different alternative responses to dynamically inconsistent behaviors consecutive to hyperbolic discounting. Two main types of action are possible, self-commanding strategies and paternalism The first category includes personal rules and pre-commitment The second can be subcategorized between coercive and non-coercive forms of paternalism, which are respectively associated (although it is debatable) with legal paternalism and with ‘nudges’. Despite being self-inflicted, self-commanding strategies are actually not cost free and can result in a dramatic cutback of people’s freedom of choice. Likewise, legal paternalism can, on occasion, be less harmful than personal rules or pre-commitment; similarly, nudges can be more invasive and less effective than their proponents want us to believe. The aim of this paper is not to propose any standardized form of response to irrational behavior (whatever that may mean) but to argue, on the contrary, that every case should be individually appraised. Individual situations can be remedied by self-commanding strategies or by paternalistic policies, either in isolation or in combination.
format	article
author	Christophe Salvat
author_facet	Christophe Salvat
author_sort	Christophe Salvat
title	Economics of paternalism: the hidden costs of self-commanding strategies
title_short	Economics of paternalism: the hidden costs of self-commanding strategies
title_full	Economics of paternalism: the hidden costs of self-commanding strategies
title_fullStr	Economics of paternalism: the hidden costs of self-commanding strategies
title_full_unstemmed	Economics of paternalism: the hidden costs of self-commanding strategies
title_sort	economics of paternalism: the hidden costs of self-commanding strategies
publisher	Editura ASE Bucuresti
publishDate	2015
url	https://doaj.org/article/7eb3c26408164b33a64f2ad5c3ddec4c
work_keys_str_mv	AT christophesalvat economicsofpaternalismthehiddencostsofselfcommandingstrategies
_version_	1718403146801217536

Economics of paternalism: the hidden costs of self-commanding strategies

Ejemplares similares