Peer review, program officers and science funding.
Increased competition for research funding has led to growth in proposal submissions and lower funding-success rates. An agent-based model of the funding cycle, accounting for variations in program officer and reviewer behaviors, for a range of funding rates, is used to assess the efficiency of diff...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2011
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/81822547237b49a7a1f8e4599c4f716e |
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| Sumario: | Increased competition for research funding has led to growth in proposal submissions and lower funding-success rates. An agent-based model of the funding cycle, accounting for variations in program officer and reviewer behaviors, for a range of funding rates, is used to assess the efficiency of different proposal-submission strategies. Program officers who use more reviewers and require consensus can improve the chances of scientists submitting fewer proposals. Selfish or negligent reviewers reduce the effectiveness of submitting more proposals, but have less influence as available funding declines. Policies designed to decrease proposal submissions reduce reviewer workload, but can lower the quality of funded proposals. When available funding falls below 10-15% in this model, the most effective strategy for scientists to maintain funding is to submit many proposals. |
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