Human players manage to extort more than the mutual cooperation payoff in repeated social dilemmas
Abstract Social dilemmas are mixed-motive games. Although the players have a common interest in maintaining cooperation, each may try to obtain a larger payoff by cooperating less than the other. This phenomenon received increased attention after Press and Dyson discovered a class of strategies for...
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Autores principales: | Chiara D’Arcangelo, Luciano Andreozzi, Marco Faillo |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN |
Publicado: |
Nature Portfolio
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/8284e3c907104989a512c134c0307949 |
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