Collective Intentionality: A Human – not a Monkey – Business

In Making the Social World Searle makes the same claim he made in 1995: that “Human beings along with a lot of other social animals, have the capacity for collective intentionality” (Searle 2010, 43). In this paper I aim to show that Searle’s “overattribution” of collective intentionality to non-hu...

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Autor principal:	Angelica Kaufmann
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	intentionality social coordination collaboration Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/829c13de9f7748cfb57ffd21d0102c1a
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:829c13de9f7748cfb57ffd21d0102c1a2021-12-02T09:51:20ZCollective Intentionality: A Human – not a Monkey – Business10.13128/Phe_Mi-196292280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/829c13de9f7748cfb57ffd21d0102c1a2016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7076https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 In Making the Social World Searle makes the same claim he made in 1995: that “Human beings along with a lot of other social animals, have the capacity for collective intentionality” (Searle 2010, 43). In this paper I aim to show that Searle’s “overattribution” of collective intentionality to non-human animals is unjustified. Firstly, I briefly reconstruct and augment Tomasello & Rakoczy’s (2007) criticism that Searle overemphasises the primitiveness of the notion of collective intentionality. Secondly, I will investigate the domain of cooperative behaviour by means of a comparative, crossspecies methodology driven by an enactivist approach. Such an approach can help us to understand (i) why Searle overattributes collective intentionality, (ii) how we can resist such an overattribution, and (iii) why we ought to resist it. Thirdly, I argue that Searle’s six conditions of adequacy for any account of collective intentionality are incompatible with his attribution of collective intentionality to non-human animals. Finally, I conclude by noting that Searle’s overattribution has important consequences for his system, as it implicates that human uniqueness begins with institutional reality rather than with collective intentionality and social ontology. Angelica KaufmannRosenberg & Sellierarticleintentionalitysocial coordinationcollaborationAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 2 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	intentionality social coordination collaboration Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	intentionality social coordination collaboration Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Angelica Kaufmann Collective Intentionality: A Human – not a Monkey – Business
description	In Making the Social World Searle makes the same claim he made in 1995: that “Human beings along with a lot of other social animals, have the capacity for collective intentionality” (Searle 2010, 43). In this paper I aim to show that Searle’s “overattribution” of collective intentionality to non-human animals is unjustified. Firstly, I briefly reconstruct and augment Tomasello & Rakoczy’s (2007) criticism that Searle overemphasises the primitiveness of the notion of collective intentionality. Secondly, I will investigate the domain of cooperative behaviour by means of a comparative, crossspecies methodology driven by an enactivist approach. Such an approach can help us to understand (i) why Searle overattributes collective intentionality, (ii) how we can resist such an overattribution, and (iii) why we ought to resist it. Thirdly, I argue that Searle’s six conditions of adequacy for any account of collective intentionality are incompatible with his attribution of collective intentionality to non-human animals. Finally, I conclude by noting that Searle’s overattribution has important consequences for his system, as it implicates that human uniqueness begins with institutional reality rather than with collective intentionality and social ontology.
format	article
author	Angelica Kaufmann
author_facet	Angelica Kaufmann
author_sort	Angelica Kaufmann
title	Collective Intentionality: A Human – not a Monkey – Business
title_short	Collective Intentionality: A Human – not a Monkey – Business
title_full	Collective Intentionality: A Human – not a Monkey – Business
title_fullStr	Collective Intentionality: A Human – not a Monkey – Business
title_full_unstemmed	Collective Intentionality: A Human – not a Monkey – Business
title_sort	collective intentionality: a human – not a monkey – business
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/829c13de9f7748cfb57ffd21d0102c1a
work_keys_str_mv	AT angelicakaufmann collectiveintentionalityahumannotamonkeybusiness
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Collective Intentionality: A Human – not a Monkey – Business

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