Collective Intentionality: A Human – not a Monkey – Business
In Making the Social World Searle makes the same claim he made in 1995: that “Human beings along with a lot of other social animals, have the capacity for collective intentionality” (Searle 2010, 43). In this paper I aim to show that Searle’s “overattribution” of collective intentionality to non-hu...
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Autor principal: | Angelica Kaufmann |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
Publicado: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/829c13de9f7748cfb57ffd21d0102c1a |
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