The Psychology of Existential Risk: Moral Judgments about Human Extinction

Abstract The 21st century will likely see growing risks of human extinction, but currently, relatively small resources are invested in reducing such existential risks. Using three samples (UK general public, US general public, and UK students; total N = 2,507), we study how laypeople reason about hu...

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Autores principales:	Stefan Schubert, Lucius Caviola, Nadira S. Faber
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2019
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/82afa750f6404c8ab216aec81b9f31eb
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:82afa750f6404c8ab216aec81b9f31eb2021-12-02T15:09:46ZThe Psychology of Existential Risk: Moral Judgments about Human Extinction10.1038/s41598-019-50145-92045-2322https://doaj.org/article/82afa750f6404c8ab216aec81b9f31eb2019-10-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-50145-9https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract The 21st century will likely see growing risks of human extinction, but currently, relatively small resources are invested in reducing such existential risks. Using three samples (UK general public, US general public, and UK students; total N = 2,507), we study how laypeople reason about human extinction. We find that people think that human extinction needs to be prevented. Strikingly, however, they do not think that an extinction catastrophe would be uniquely bad relative to near-extinction catastrophes, which allow for recovery. More people find extinction uniquely bad when (a) asked to consider the extinction of an animal species rather than humans, (b) asked to consider a case where human extinction is associated with less direct harm, and (c) they are explicitly prompted to consider long-term consequences of the catastrophes. We conclude that an important reason why people do not find extinction uniquely bad is that they focus on the immediate death and suffering that the catastrophes cause for fellow humans, rather than on the long-term consequences. Finally, we find that (d) laypeople—in line with prominent philosophical arguments—think that the quality of the future is relevant: they do find extinction uniquely bad when this means forgoing a utopian future.Stefan SchubertLucius CaviolaNadira S. FaberNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 9, Iss 1, Pp 1-8 (2019)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Stefan Schubert Lucius Caviola Nadira S. Faber The Psychology of Existential Risk: Moral Judgments about Human Extinction
description	Abstract The 21st century will likely see growing risks of human extinction, but currently, relatively small resources are invested in reducing such existential risks. Using three samples (UK general public, US general public, and UK students; total N = 2,507), we study how laypeople reason about human extinction. We find that people think that human extinction needs to be prevented. Strikingly, however, they do not think that an extinction catastrophe would be uniquely bad relative to near-extinction catastrophes, which allow for recovery. More people find extinction uniquely bad when (a) asked to consider the extinction of an animal species rather than humans, (b) asked to consider a case where human extinction is associated with less direct harm, and (c) they are explicitly prompted to consider long-term consequences of the catastrophes. We conclude that an important reason why people do not find extinction uniquely bad is that they focus on the immediate death and suffering that the catastrophes cause for fellow humans, rather than on the long-term consequences. Finally, we find that (d) laypeople—in line with prominent philosophical arguments—think that the quality of the future is relevant: they do find extinction uniquely bad when this means forgoing a utopian future.
format	article
author	Stefan Schubert Lucius Caviola Nadira S. Faber
author_facet	Stefan Schubert Lucius Caviola Nadira S. Faber
author_sort	Stefan Schubert
title	The Psychology of Existential Risk: Moral Judgments about Human Extinction
title_short	The Psychology of Existential Risk: Moral Judgments about Human Extinction
title_full	The Psychology of Existential Risk: Moral Judgments about Human Extinction
title_fullStr	The Psychology of Existential Risk: Moral Judgments about Human Extinction
title_full_unstemmed	The Psychology of Existential Risk: Moral Judgments about Human Extinction
title_sort	psychology of existential risk: moral judgments about human extinction
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2019
url	https://doaj.org/article/82afa750f6404c8ab216aec81b9f31eb
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The Psychology of Existential Risk: Moral Judgments about Human Extinction

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