Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain. Here, inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emission limitations, the authors experimentally studied a representative-based collective-risk scenario, reporting the emergence of extortionate zero-determinant (ZD)...
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| Autores principales: | , , , , |
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
Nature Portfolio
2016
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/85149ede06b944baa92958a9014b283a |
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| Sumario: | Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain. Here, inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emission limitations, the authors experimentally studied a representative-based collective-risk scenario, reporting the emergence of extortionate zero-determinant (ZD) strategies. |
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