Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion

Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain. Here, inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emission limitations, the authors experimentally studied a representative-based collective-risk scenario, reporting the emergence of extortionate zero-determinant (ZD)...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Manfred Milinski, Christian Hilbe, Dirk Semmann, Ralf Sommerfeld, Jochem Marotzke
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2016
Materias:	Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/85149ede06b944baa92958a9014b283a
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:85149ede06b944baa92958a9014b283a
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:85149ede06b944baa92958a9014b283a2021-12-02T17:33:20ZHumans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion10.1038/ncomms109152041-1723https://doaj.org/article/85149ede06b944baa92958a9014b283a2016-03-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms10915https://doaj.org/toc/2041-1723Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain. Here, inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emission limitations, the authors experimentally studied a representative-based collective-risk scenario, reporting the emergence of extortionate zero-determinant (ZD) strategies.Manfred MilinskiChristian HilbeDirk SemmannRalf SommerfeldJochem MarotzkeNature PortfolioarticleScienceQENNature Communications, Vol 7, Iss 1, Pp 1-9 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Science Q
spellingShingle	Science Q Manfred Milinski Christian Hilbe Dirk Semmann Ralf Sommerfeld Jochem Marotzke Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
description	Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain. Here, inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emission limitations, the authors experimentally studied a representative-based collective-risk scenario, reporting the emergence of extortionate zero-determinant (ZD) strategies.
format	article
author	Manfred Milinski Christian Hilbe Dirk Semmann Ralf Sommerfeld Jochem Marotzke
author_facet	Manfred Milinski Christian Hilbe Dirk Semmann Ralf Sommerfeld Jochem Marotzke
author_sort	Manfred Milinski
title	Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
title_short	Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
title_full	Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
title_fullStr	Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
title_full_unstemmed	Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
title_sort	humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/85149ede06b944baa92958a9014b283a
work_keys_str_mv	AT manfredmilinski humanschooserepresentativeswhoenforcecooperationinsocialdilemmasthroughextortion AT christianhilbe humanschooserepresentativeswhoenforcecooperationinsocialdilemmasthroughextortion AT dirksemmann humanschooserepresentativeswhoenforcecooperationinsocialdilemmasthroughextortion AT ralfsommerfeld humanschooserepresentativeswhoenforcecooperationinsocialdilemmasthroughextortion AT jochemmarotzke humanschooserepresentativeswhoenforcecooperationinsocialdilemmasthroughextortion
_version_	1718380010627137536

Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion

Ejemplares similares