Online User Information Sharing and Government Pandemic Prevention and Control Strategies-Based on Evolutionary Game Model

Background: The sharing and utilization of online users' information has become an important resource for governments to manage COVID-19; however, it also involves the risk of leakage of users' personal information. Online users' sharing decisions regarding personal information and th...

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Autores principales: Yao Xiao, Wanting Xu, Shouzhen Zeng, Qiao Peng
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Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Frontiers Media S.A. 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/8529425dee294dfb9192f860f2add743
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:8529425dee294dfb9192f860f2add7432021-11-15T05:36:45ZOnline User Information Sharing and Government Pandemic Prevention and Control Strategies-Based on Evolutionary Game Model2296-256510.3389/fpubh.2021.747239https://doaj.org/article/8529425dee294dfb9192f860f2add7432021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpubh.2021.747239/fullhttps://doaj.org/toc/2296-2565Background: The sharing and utilization of online users' information has become an important resource for governments to manage COVID-19; however, it also involves the risk of leakage of users' personal information. Online users' sharing decisions regarding personal information and the government's COVID-19 prevention and control decisions influence each other and jointly determine the efficiency of COVID-19 control and prevention.Method: Using the evolutionary game models, this paper examines the behavioral patterns of online users and governments with regard to the sharing and disclosure of COVID-19 information for its prevention and control.Results: This paper deduce the reasons and solutions underlying the contradiction between the privacy risks faced by online users in sharing information and COVID-19 prevention and control efforts. The inconsistency between individual and collective rationality is the root cause of the inefficiency of COVID-19 prevention and control.Conclusions: The reconciliation of privacy protection with COVID-19 prevention and control efficiency can be achieved by providing guidance and incentives to modulate internet users' behavioral expectations.Yao XiaoYao XiaoWanting XuWanting XuShouzhen ZengQiao PengFrontiers Media S.A.articleonline usersgovernmentinformation sharingprivacy protectionCOVID-19 prevention and controlPublic aspects of medicineRA1-1270ENFrontiers in Public Health, Vol 9 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic online users
government
information sharing
privacy protection
COVID-19 prevention and control
Public aspects of medicine
RA1-1270
spellingShingle online users
government
information sharing
privacy protection
COVID-19 prevention and control
Public aspects of medicine
RA1-1270
Yao Xiao
Yao Xiao
Wanting Xu
Wanting Xu
Shouzhen Zeng
Qiao Peng
Online User Information Sharing and Government Pandemic Prevention and Control Strategies-Based on Evolutionary Game Model
description Background: The sharing and utilization of online users' information has become an important resource for governments to manage COVID-19; however, it also involves the risk of leakage of users' personal information. Online users' sharing decisions regarding personal information and the government's COVID-19 prevention and control decisions influence each other and jointly determine the efficiency of COVID-19 control and prevention.Method: Using the evolutionary game models, this paper examines the behavioral patterns of online users and governments with regard to the sharing and disclosure of COVID-19 information for its prevention and control.Results: This paper deduce the reasons and solutions underlying the contradiction between the privacy risks faced by online users in sharing information and COVID-19 prevention and control efforts. The inconsistency between individual and collective rationality is the root cause of the inefficiency of COVID-19 prevention and control.Conclusions: The reconciliation of privacy protection with COVID-19 prevention and control efficiency can be achieved by providing guidance and incentives to modulate internet users' behavioral expectations.
format article
author Yao Xiao
Yao Xiao
Wanting Xu
Wanting Xu
Shouzhen Zeng
Qiao Peng
author_facet Yao Xiao
Yao Xiao
Wanting Xu
Wanting Xu
Shouzhen Zeng
Qiao Peng
author_sort Yao Xiao
title Online User Information Sharing and Government Pandemic Prevention and Control Strategies-Based on Evolutionary Game Model
title_short Online User Information Sharing and Government Pandemic Prevention and Control Strategies-Based on Evolutionary Game Model
title_full Online User Information Sharing and Government Pandemic Prevention and Control Strategies-Based on Evolutionary Game Model
title_fullStr Online User Information Sharing and Government Pandemic Prevention and Control Strategies-Based on Evolutionary Game Model
title_full_unstemmed Online User Information Sharing and Government Pandemic Prevention and Control Strategies-Based on Evolutionary Game Model
title_sort online user information sharing and government pandemic prevention and control strategies-based on evolutionary game model
publisher Frontiers Media S.A.
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/8529425dee294dfb9192f860f2add743
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AT yaoxiao onlineuserinformationsharingandgovernmentpandemicpreventionandcontrolstrategiesbasedonevolutionarygamemodel
AT wantingxu onlineuserinformationsharingandgovernmentpandemicpreventionandcontrolstrategiesbasedonevolutionarygamemodel
AT wantingxu onlineuserinformationsharingandgovernmentpandemicpreventionandcontrolstrategiesbasedonevolutionarygamemodel
AT shouzhenzeng onlineuserinformationsharingandgovernmentpandemicpreventionandcontrolstrategiesbasedonevolutionarygamemodel
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