Habit and the Extended Mind: Fleshing Out the Extended Mind Theory with Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology

This short essay attempts to flesh out the extended mind thesis by showing the nontrivial role of the body in skilled epistemic action. This is attempted by bringing Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body schema together with Clark and Chalmers account of the extended mind. What the author hopes to sho...

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Autor principal: Richard Charles Strong
Formato: article
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IT
Publicado: Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/85f8e14bd44d4e5e8a6db0bccfc45604
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:85f8e14bd44d4e5e8a6db0bccfc456042021-12-02T10:54:14ZHabit and the Extended Mind: Fleshing Out the Extended Mind Theory with Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology10.13128/Phe_Mi-195572280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/85f8e14bd44d4e5e8a6db0bccfc456042016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7151https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 This short essay attempts to flesh out the extended mind thesis by showing the nontrivial role of the body in skilled epistemic action. This is attempted by bringing Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body schema together with Clark and Chalmers account of the extended mind. What the author hopes to show is that the incorporation of new habits into one’s body schema can make a meaningful difference for extended cognition as it regards behavioral competence, systemic performance, endorsement of external components, and typical invocation of external components. Habitualization of one’s body to environment and things in the environment is perhaps not a central part of the cognitive system - nor is it always necessary - but habit can and does make a meaningful difference in how well a coupled cognitive system might function and therefore ought to be taken into account. Moreover, habit highlights the extent to which enhanced cognitive performance relies on the body and its organs in conjunction with mind and thing. The essay proceeds by introducing Clark and Chalmers’ version of the extended mind hypothesis from before turning to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the acquisition of habit qua modifications of the body-schema in conjunction with the extended mind. Richard Charles StrongRosenberg & Sellierarticleextended mindMerleau-Pontyhabitbody-schemaskilled actionAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 6 (2016)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
FR
IT
topic extended mind
Merleau-Ponty
habit
body-schema
skilled action
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
spellingShingle extended mind
Merleau-Ponty
habit
body-schema
skilled action
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
Richard Charles Strong
Habit and the Extended Mind: Fleshing Out the Extended Mind Theory with Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology
description This short essay attempts to flesh out the extended mind thesis by showing the nontrivial role of the body in skilled epistemic action. This is attempted by bringing Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body schema together with Clark and Chalmers account of the extended mind. What the author hopes to show is that the incorporation of new habits into one’s body schema can make a meaningful difference for extended cognition as it regards behavioral competence, systemic performance, endorsement of external components, and typical invocation of external components. Habitualization of one’s body to environment and things in the environment is perhaps not a central part of the cognitive system - nor is it always necessary - but habit can and does make a meaningful difference in how well a coupled cognitive system might function and therefore ought to be taken into account. Moreover, habit highlights the extent to which enhanced cognitive performance relies on the body and its organs in conjunction with mind and thing. The essay proceeds by introducing Clark and Chalmers’ version of the extended mind hypothesis from before turning to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the acquisition of habit qua modifications of the body-schema in conjunction with the extended mind.
format article
author Richard Charles Strong
author_facet Richard Charles Strong
author_sort Richard Charles Strong
title Habit and the Extended Mind: Fleshing Out the Extended Mind Theory with Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology
title_short Habit and the Extended Mind: Fleshing Out the Extended Mind Theory with Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology
title_full Habit and the Extended Mind: Fleshing Out the Extended Mind Theory with Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology
title_fullStr Habit and the Extended Mind: Fleshing Out the Extended Mind Theory with Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology
title_full_unstemmed Habit and the Extended Mind: Fleshing Out the Extended Mind Theory with Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology
title_sort habit and the extended mind: fleshing out the extended mind theory with merleau-pontian phenomenology
publisher Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate 2016
url https://doaj.org/article/85f8e14bd44d4e5e8a6db0bccfc45604
work_keys_str_mv AT richardcharlesstrong habitandtheextendedmindfleshingouttheextendedmindtheorywithmerleaupontianphenomenology
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