Fantasies and facts: epistemological and methodological perspectives on rst- and third-person perspectives

In this paper, I challenge two Cartesian assumptions. The first assumption to be challenged is that there is an independent solitary self (material or immaterial) that is a proper part of a person (i.e., a human being). I challenge this assumption by setting out a materialistic alternative to Desca...

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Autor principal:	Shaun Gallagher
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	Descartes self first-person perspective person Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/865c3dc0f5a4473eabfa699efbbaa646
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:865c3dc0f5a4473eabfa699efbbaa6462021-12-02T09:29:57ZFantasies and facts: epistemological and methodological perspectives on rst- and third-person perspectives10.13128/Phe_Mi-196422280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/865c3dc0f5a4473eabfa699efbbaa6462016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7050https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 In this paper, I challenge two Cartesian assumptions. The first assumption to be challenged is that there is an independent solitary self (material or immaterial) that is a proper part of a person (i.e., a human being). I challenge this assumption by setting out a materialistic alternative to Descartes – one that, on the one hand, abandons solitariness, yet on the other hand, retains the significance of the first-person perspective so prominent in Descartes’ account. On my view, persons have first-person perspectives essentially, and first-person perspectives provide persistence conditions for persons. However, persons have no inner selves or inner agents; they have no parts that are selves at all. The second assumption that I challenge is one that equates what is real with what is in some strict sense mind-independent. The assumption, so widespread today, is that what has ontological status can exist in a world without mentality. On this assumption, nothing mental or intentional belongs in the basic ontology of the world. I’ll try to show that this assumption is traceable to Descartes’ view of minds and bodies, and that it is wrong. Shaun GallagherRosenberg & SellierarticleDescartesselffirst-person perspectivepersonAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 1 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	Descartes self first-person perspective person Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	Descartes self first-person perspective person Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Shaun Gallagher Fantasies and facts: epistemological and methodological perspectives on rst- and third-person perspectives
description	In this paper, I challenge two Cartesian assumptions. The first assumption to be challenged is that there is an independent solitary self (material or immaterial) that is a proper part of a person (i.e., a human being). I challenge this assumption by setting out a materialistic alternative to Descartes – one that, on the one hand, abandons solitariness, yet on the other hand, retains the significance of the first-person perspective so prominent in Descartes’ account. On my view, persons have first-person perspectives essentially, and first-person perspectives provide persistence conditions for persons. However, persons have no inner selves or inner agents; they have no parts that are selves at all. The second assumption that I challenge is one that equates what is real with what is in some strict sense mind-independent. The assumption, so widespread today, is that what has ontological status can exist in a world without mentality. On this assumption, nothing mental or intentional belongs in the basic ontology of the world. I’ll try to show that this assumption is traceable to Descartes’ view of minds and bodies, and that it is wrong.
format	article
author	Shaun Gallagher
author_facet	Shaun Gallagher
author_sort	Shaun Gallagher
title	Fantasies and facts: epistemological and methodological perspectives on rst- and third-person perspectives
title_short	Fantasies and facts: epistemological and methodological perspectives on rst- and third-person perspectives
title_full	Fantasies and facts: epistemological and methodological perspectives on rst- and third-person perspectives
title_fullStr	Fantasies and facts: epistemological and methodological perspectives on rst- and third-person perspectives
title_full_unstemmed	Fantasies and facts: epistemological and methodological perspectives on rst- and third-person perspectives
title_sort	fantasies and facts: epistemological and methodological perspectives on rst- and third-person perspectives
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/865c3dc0f5a4473eabfa699efbbaa646
work_keys_str_mv	AT shaungallagher fantasiesandfactsepistemologicalandmethodologicalperspectivesonrstandthirdpersonperspectives
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Fantasies and facts: epistemological and methodological perspectives on rst- and third-person perspectives

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