Evolution of costly signaling and partial cooperation

Abstract Two seemingly unrelated, but fundamental challenges in evolutionary theory, are the evolution of costly signals and costly cooperative traits, both expected to reduce an individual’s fitness and diminish by natural selection. Here, by considering a well mixed population of individuals who p...

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Autor principal:	Mohammad Salahshour
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2019
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/8710c9886495463b9595244bca8c3899
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:8710c9886495463b9595244bca8c38992021-12-02T15:08:19ZEvolution of costly signaling and partial cooperation10.1038/s41598-019-45272-22045-2322https://doaj.org/article/8710c9886495463b9595244bca8c38992019-06-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-45272-2https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Two seemingly unrelated, but fundamental challenges in evolutionary theory, are the evolution of costly signals and costly cooperative traits, both expected to reduce an individual’s fitness and diminish by natural selection. Here, by considering a well mixed population of individuals who produce signals and decide on their strategies in a game they play, based on the signals, we show that costly signals and costly cooperative strategies can co-evolve as a result of internal dynamics of the system. Costly signals evolve, despite their apparent cost, due to a favorable cooperative response they elicit. This favorable strategic response can be quantified in a fitness term which governs the distribution of costly signals better than their apparent cost. In the same way, cooperative strategies evolve as they can reach a high fitness due to the internal dynamics of the systems.Mohammad SalahshourNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 9, Iss 1, Pp 1-7 (2019)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Mohammad Salahshour Evolution of costly signaling and partial cooperation
description	Abstract Two seemingly unrelated, but fundamental challenges in evolutionary theory, are the evolution of costly signals and costly cooperative traits, both expected to reduce an individual’s fitness and diminish by natural selection. Here, by considering a well mixed population of individuals who produce signals and decide on their strategies in a game they play, based on the signals, we show that costly signals and costly cooperative strategies can co-evolve as a result of internal dynamics of the system. Costly signals evolve, despite their apparent cost, due to a favorable cooperative response they elicit. This favorable strategic response can be quantified in a fitness term which governs the distribution of costly signals better than their apparent cost. In the same way, cooperative strategies evolve as they can reach a high fitness due to the internal dynamics of the systems.
format	article
author	Mohammad Salahshour
author_facet	Mohammad Salahshour
author_sort	Mohammad Salahshour
title	Evolution of costly signaling and partial cooperation
title_short	Evolution of costly signaling and partial cooperation
title_full	Evolution of costly signaling and partial cooperation
title_fullStr	Evolution of costly signaling and partial cooperation
title_full_unstemmed	Evolution of costly signaling and partial cooperation
title_sort	evolution of costly signaling and partial cooperation
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2019
url	https://doaj.org/article/8710c9886495463b9595244bca8c3899
work_keys_str_mv	AT mohammadsalahshour evolutionofcostlysignalingandpartialcooperation
_version_	1718388198746357760

Evolution of costly signaling and partial cooperation

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