Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the ‘Extended Mind’

This paper interweaves a ‘micro’ theme concerning shame and guilt and a ‘macro’ theme concerning self-regulation generally. Neither shame nor guilt is more other-independent than the other. Moreover, because other-dependence in either emotion is not a mark of heteronomy, neither emotion is more cha...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal:	Edward Harcourt
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2017
Materias:	guilt shame self-regulation autonomy heteronomy Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/8796df1476a841fd8569e3665bb4b72b
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:8796df1476a841fd8569e3665bb4b72b
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:8796df1476a841fd8569e3665bb4b72b2021-12-02T12:01:57ZMoral Emotion, Autonomy and the ‘Extended Mind’10.13128/Phe_Mi-201102280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/8796df1476a841fd8569e3665bb4b72b2017-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7247https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 This paper interweaves a ‘micro’ theme concerning shame and guilt and a ‘macro’ theme concerning self-regulation generally. Neither shame nor guilt is more other-independent than the other. Moreover, because other-dependence in either emotion is not a mark of heteronomy, neither emotion is more characteristic of a well-functioning moral consciousness. Then, relying on phenomena described by ‘extended mind’ theorists, I argue that a common view of self-regulation in children – that it is importantly other-dependent – is also true of adult self-regulation. But that is all the more reason to think that other-dependence and a well-functioning moral consciousness can go together. Moreover, since shame and guilt are one aspect of self-regulation, if other-dependence can be a characteristic generally of our well-functioning self-regulation – the ‘macro’ thesis – this supports the ‘micro’ thesis that other-dependence can characterize the well-functioning of both shame and guilt. The conclusion is that heteronomy lies not in the fact of other-dependence but in the nature of the dependence. Edward HarcourtRosenberg & Sellierarticleguiltshameself-regulationautonomyheteronomyAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 11 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	guilt shame self-regulation autonomy heteronomy Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	guilt shame self-regulation autonomy heteronomy Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Edward Harcourt Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the ‘Extended Mind’
description	This paper interweaves a ‘micro’ theme concerning shame and guilt and a ‘macro’ theme concerning self-regulation generally. Neither shame nor guilt is more other-independent than the other. Moreover, because other-dependence in either emotion is not a mark of heteronomy, neither emotion is more characteristic of a well-functioning moral consciousness. Then, relying on phenomena described by ‘extended mind’ theorists, I argue that a common view of self-regulation in children – that it is importantly other-dependent – is also true of adult self-regulation. But that is all the more reason to think that other-dependence and a well-functioning moral consciousness can go together. Moreover, since shame and guilt are one aspect of self-regulation, if other-dependence can be a characteristic generally of our well-functioning self-regulation – the ‘macro’ thesis – this supports the ‘micro’ thesis that other-dependence can characterize the well-functioning of both shame and guilt. The conclusion is that heteronomy lies not in the fact of other-dependence but in the nature of the dependence.
format	article
author	Edward Harcourt
author_facet	Edward Harcourt
author_sort	Edward Harcourt
title	Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the ‘Extended Mind’
title_short	Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the ‘Extended Mind’
title_full	Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the ‘Extended Mind’
title_fullStr	Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the ‘Extended Mind’
title_full_unstemmed	Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the ‘Extended Mind’
title_sort	moral emotion, autonomy and the ‘extended mind’
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/8796df1476a841fd8569e3665bb4b72b
work_keys_str_mv	AT edwardharcourt moralemotionautonomyandtheextendedmind
_version_	1718394760536784896

Moral Emotion, Autonomy and the ‘Extended Mind’

Ejemplares similares