Antisocial rewarding in structured populations

Abstract Cooperation in collective action dilemmas usually breaks down in the absence of additional incentive mechanisms. This tragedy can be escaped if cooperators have the possibility to invest in reward funds that are shared exclusively among cooperators (prosocial rewarding). Yet, the presence o...

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Autores principales:	Miguel dos Santos, Jorge Peña
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2017
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/8b4c08b390c741bba194ebaa6dc18051
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:8b4c08b390c741bba194ebaa6dc180512021-12-02T12:32:02ZAntisocial rewarding in structured populations10.1038/s41598-017-06063-92045-2322https://doaj.org/article/8b4c08b390c741bba194ebaa6dc180512017-07-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-06063-9https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Cooperation in collective action dilemmas usually breaks down in the absence of additional incentive mechanisms. This tragedy can be escaped if cooperators have the possibility to invest in reward funds that are shared exclusively among cooperators (prosocial rewarding). Yet, the presence of defectors who do not contribute to the public good but do reward themselves (antisocial rewarding) deters cooperation in the absence of additional countermeasures. A recent simulation study suggests that spatial structure is sufficient to prevent antisocial rewarding from deterring cooperation. Here we reinvestigate this issue assuming mixed strategies and weak selection on a game-theoretic model of social interactions, which we also validate using individual-based simulations. We show that increasing reward funds facilitates the maintenance of prosocial rewarding but prevents its invasion, and that spatial structure can sometimes select against the evolution of prosocial rewarding. Our results suggest that, even in spatially structured populations, additional mechanisms are required to prevent antisocial rewarding from deterring cooperation in public goods dilemmas.Miguel dos SantosJorge PeñaNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 7, Iss 1, Pp 1-14 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Miguel dos Santos Jorge Peña Antisocial rewarding in structured populations
description	Abstract Cooperation in collective action dilemmas usually breaks down in the absence of additional incentive mechanisms. This tragedy can be escaped if cooperators have the possibility to invest in reward funds that are shared exclusively among cooperators (prosocial rewarding). Yet, the presence of defectors who do not contribute to the public good but do reward themselves (antisocial rewarding) deters cooperation in the absence of additional countermeasures. A recent simulation study suggests that spatial structure is sufficient to prevent antisocial rewarding from deterring cooperation. Here we reinvestigate this issue assuming mixed strategies and weak selection on a game-theoretic model of social interactions, which we also validate using individual-based simulations. We show that increasing reward funds facilitates the maintenance of prosocial rewarding but prevents its invasion, and that spatial structure can sometimes select against the evolution of prosocial rewarding. Our results suggest that, even in spatially structured populations, additional mechanisms are required to prevent antisocial rewarding from deterring cooperation in public goods dilemmas.
format	article
author	Miguel dos Santos Jorge Peña
author_facet	Miguel dos Santos Jorge Peña
author_sort	Miguel dos Santos
title	Antisocial rewarding in structured populations
title_short	Antisocial rewarding in structured populations
title_full	Antisocial rewarding in structured populations
title_fullStr	Antisocial rewarding in structured populations
title_full_unstemmed	Antisocial rewarding in structured populations
title_sort	antisocial rewarding in structured populations
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/8b4c08b390c741bba194ebaa6dc18051
work_keys_str_mv	AT migueldossantos antisocialrewardinginstructuredpopulations AT jorgepena antisocialrewardinginstructuredpopulations
_version_	1718394226591399936

Antisocial rewarding in structured populations

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