Antisocial rewarding in structured populations

Abstract Cooperation in collective action dilemmas usually breaks down in the absence of additional incentive mechanisms. This tragedy can be escaped if cooperators have the possibility to invest in reward funds that are shared exclusively among cooperators (prosocial rewarding). Yet, the presence o...

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Autores principales: Miguel dos Santos, Jorge Peña
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Nature Portfolio 2017
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/8b4c08b390c741bba194ebaa6dc18051
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