Paranoia, self-deception and overconfidence.

Self-deception, paranoia, and overconfidence involve misbeliefs about the self, others, and world. They are often considered mistaken. Here we explore whether they might be adaptive, and further, whether they might be explicable in Bayesian terms. We administered a difficult perceptual judgment task...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Rosa A Rossi-Goldthorpe, Yuan Chang Leong, Pantelis Leptourgos, Philip R Corlett
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/8b54b99c2bad4bc8835ed175a658a484
Etiquetas: Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
id oai:doaj.org-article:8b54b99c2bad4bc8835ed175a658a484
record_format dspace
spelling oai:doaj.org-article:8b54b99c2bad4bc8835ed175a658a4842021-11-25T05:42:07ZParanoia, self-deception and overconfidence.1553-734X1553-735810.1371/journal.pcbi.1009453https://doaj.org/article/8b54b99c2bad4bc8835ed175a658a4842021-10-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009453https://doaj.org/toc/1553-734Xhttps://doaj.org/toc/1553-7358Self-deception, paranoia, and overconfidence involve misbeliefs about the self, others, and world. They are often considered mistaken. Here we explore whether they might be adaptive, and further, whether they might be explicable in Bayesian terms. We administered a difficult perceptual judgment task with and without social influence (suggestions from a cooperating or competing partner). Crucially, the social influence was uninformative. We found that participants heeded the suggestions most under the most uncertain conditions and that they did so with high confidence, particularly if they were more paranoid. Model fitting to participant behavior revealed that their prior beliefs changed depending on whether the partner was a collaborator or competitor, however, those beliefs did not differ as a function of paranoia. Instead, paranoia, self-deception, and overconfidence were associated with participants' perceived instability of their own performance. These data are consistent with the idea that self-deception, paranoia, and overconfidence flourish under uncertainty, and have their roots in low self-esteem, rather than excessive social concern. The model suggests that spurious beliefs can have value-self-deception is irrational yet can facilitate optimal behavior. This occurs even at the expense of monetary rewards, perhaps explaining why self-deception and paranoia contribute to costly decisions which can spark financial crashes and devastating wars.Rosa A Rossi-GoldthorpeYuan Chang LeongPantelis LeptourgosPhilip R CorlettPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleBiology (General)QH301-705.5ENPLoS Computational Biology, Vol 17, Iss 10, p e1009453 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic Biology (General)
QH301-705.5
spellingShingle Biology (General)
QH301-705.5
Rosa A Rossi-Goldthorpe
Yuan Chang Leong
Pantelis Leptourgos
Philip R Corlett
Paranoia, self-deception and overconfidence.
description Self-deception, paranoia, and overconfidence involve misbeliefs about the self, others, and world. They are often considered mistaken. Here we explore whether they might be adaptive, and further, whether they might be explicable in Bayesian terms. We administered a difficult perceptual judgment task with and without social influence (suggestions from a cooperating or competing partner). Crucially, the social influence was uninformative. We found that participants heeded the suggestions most under the most uncertain conditions and that they did so with high confidence, particularly if they were more paranoid. Model fitting to participant behavior revealed that their prior beliefs changed depending on whether the partner was a collaborator or competitor, however, those beliefs did not differ as a function of paranoia. Instead, paranoia, self-deception, and overconfidence were associated with participants' perceived instability of their own performance. These data are consistent with the idea that self-deception, paranoia, and overconfidence flourish under uncertainty, and have their roots in low self-esteem, rather than excessive social concern. The model suggests that spurious beliefs can have value-self-deception is irrational yet can facilitate optimal behavior. This occurs even at the expense of monetary rewards, perhaps explaining why self-deception and paranoia contribute to costly decisions which can spark financial crashes and devastating wars.
format article
author Rosa A Rossi-Goldthorpe
Yuan Chang Leong
Pantelis Leptourgos
Philip R Corlett
author_facet Rosa A Rossi-Goldthorpe
Yuan Chang Leong
Pantelis Leptourgos
Philip R Corlett
author_sort Rosa A Rossi-Goldthorpe
title Paranoia, self-deception and overconfidence.
title_short Paranoia, self-deception and overconfidence.
title_full Paranoia, self-deception and overconfidence.
title_fullStr Paranoia, self-deception and overconfidence.
title_full_unstemmed Paranoia, self-deception and overconfidence.
title_sort paranoia, self-deception and overconfidence.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/8b54b99c2bad4bc8835ed175a658a484
work_keys_str_mv AT rosaarossigoldthorpe paranoiaselfdeceptionandoverconfidence
AT yuanchangleong paranoiaselfdeceptionandoverconfidence
AT pantelisleptourgos paranoiaselfdeceptionandoverconfidence
AT philiprcorlett paranoiaselfdeceptionandoverconfidence
_version_ 1718414528609255424