Collective intentionality vs. intersubjective and social intentionality. An account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality

I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse phenomena, i.e. with intersubjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social intentionality. I...

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Autor principal: Francesca De Vecchi
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
FR
IT
Publicado: Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:8b62c6ba0027460784ab8fb88bc1aefb2021-12-02T10:07:09ZCollective intentionality vs. intersubjective and social intentionality. An account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality10.13128/Phe_Mi-196452280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/8b62c6ba0027460784ab8fb88bc1aefb2016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7053https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse phenomena, i.e. with intersubjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social intentionality. In order to elucidate the phenomenon of collective intentionality, I shall present a taxonomy of collective, intersubjective and social intentionality, and consider a thesis about shared intentionality. The taxonomy intends to show that although collective, intersubjective and social intentionality are very close phenomena, nonetheless they are different types of intentionality, and that, like individual intentionality, collective and intersubjective intentionality involve different kinds of intentionality – practical, affective and cognitive – which have to be distinguished. The sharing thesis, I will argue for, maintains that collective intentionality is a shared intentionality in a very strong sense of the term “sharing”, a sense that implies some essential conditions, which are not required in the cases of intersubjective and social intentionality. Finally I shall point out that intersubjective intentionality is the basis and the necessary condition for collective and social intentionality. Francesca De VecchiRosenberg & Sellierarticlecollective intentionalityintersubjective intentionalitysocial intentionalitysocial cognitioncognitivepractical and affective intentionalityAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 1 (2016)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
FR
IT
topic collective intentionality
intersubjective intentionality
social intentionality
social cognition
cognitive
practical and affective intentionality
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
spellingShingle collective intentionality
intersubjective intentionality
social intentionality
social cognition
cognitive
practical and affective intentionality
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
Francesca De Vecchi
Collective intentionality vs. intersubjective and social intentionality. An account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality
description I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse phenomena, i.e. with intersubjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social intentionality. In order to elucidate the phenomenon of collective intentionality, I shall present a taxonomy of collective, intersubjective and social intentionality, and consider a thesis about shared intentionality. The taxonomy intends to show that although collective, intersubjective and social intentionality are very close phenomena, nonetheless they are different types of intentionality, and that, like individual intentionality, collective and intersubjective intentionality involve different kinds of intentionality – practical, affective and cognitive – which have to be distinguished. The sharing thesis, I will argue for, maintains that collective intentionality is a shared intentionality in a very strong sense of the term “sharing”, a sense that implies some essential conditions, which are not required in the cases of intersubjective and social intentionality. Finally I shall point out that intersubjective intentionality is the basis and the necessary condition for collective and social intentionality.
format article
author Francesca De Vecchi
author_facet Francesca De Vecchi
author_sort Francesca De Vecchi
title Collective intentionality vs. intersubjective and social intentionality. An account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality
title_short Collective intentionality vs. intersubjective and social intentionality. An account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality
title_full Collective intentionality vs. intersubjective and social intentionality. An account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality
title_fullStr Collective intentionality vs. intersubjective and social intentionality. An account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality
title_full_unstemmed Collective intentionality vs. intersubjective and social intentionality. An account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality
title_sort collective intentionality vs. intersubjective and social intentionality. an account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality
publisher Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate 2016
url https://doaj.org/article/8b62c6ba0027460784ab8fb88bc1aefb
work_keys_str_mv AT francescadevecchi collectiveintentionalityvsintersubjectiveandsocialintentionalityanaccountofcollectiveintentionalityassharedintentionality
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