Spinoza on Metaphysical Doubt and the “Cartesian Circle”

This article offers an analysis and defense of the solution proposed by Spinoza to the “Cartesian circle” problem. Taking into consideration Spinoza’s sound analysis of the epistemic conditions of an authentic doubt, it will try to show, against the interpreters who maintain that Spinoza’s most exp...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal:	Marcos André Gleizer
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2019
Materias:	Spinoza Descartes metaphysical doubt definition of truth criterion of truth Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/8c46e7df32414b618023bab03e116d17
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:8c46e7df32414b618023bab03e116d17
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:8c46e7df32414b618023bab03e116d172021-12-02T09:25:46ZSpinoza on Metaphysical Doubt and the “Cartesian Circle”10.13128/Phe_Mi-249802280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/8c46e7df32414b618023bab03e116d172019-03-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7331https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 This article offers an analysis and defense of the solution proposed by Spinoza to the “Cartesian circle” problem. Taking into consideration Spinoza’s sound analysis of the epistemic conditions of an authentic doubt, it will try to show, against the interpreters who maintain that Spinoza’s most explicit and consistent solution fails, that his solution offers a perfectly coherent account of the self-justification of the objective value of reason. I will also briefly indicate the intimate connection existing between Spinoza’s solution to the “Cartesian circle” problem and his conception of truth as its own standard Marcos André GleizerRosenberg & SellierarticleSpinozaDescartesmetaphysical doubtdefinition of truthcriterion of truthAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 15 (2019)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	Spinoza Descartes metaphysical doubt definition of truth criterion of truth Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	Spinoza Descartes metaphysical doubt definition of truth criterion of truth Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Marcos André Gleizer Spinoza on Metaphysical Doubt and the “Cartesian Circle”
description	This article offers an analysis and defense of the solution proposed by Spinoza to the “Cartesian circle” problem. Taking into consideration Spinoza’s sound analysis of the epistemic conditions of an authentic doubt, it will try to show, against the interpreters who maintain that Spinoza’s most explicit and consistent solution fails, that his solution offers a perfectly coherent account of the self-justification of the objective value of reason. I will also briefly indicate the intimate connection existing between Spinoza’s solution to the “Cartesian circle” problem and his conception of truth as its own standard
format	article
author	Marcos André Gleizer
author_facet	Marcos André Gleizer
author_sort	Marcos André Gleizer
title	Spinoza on Metaphysical Doubt and the “Cartesian Circle”
title_short	Spinoza on Metaphysical Doubt and the “Cartesian Circle”
title_full	Spinoza on Metaphysical Doubt and the “Cartesian Circle”
title_fullStr	Spinoza on Metaphysical Doubt and the “Cartesian Circle”
title_full_unstemmed	Spinoza on Metaphysical Doubt and the “Cartesian Circle”
title_sort	spinoza on metaphysical doubt and the “cartesian circle”
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2019
url	https://doaj.org/article/8c46e7df32414b618023bab03e116d17
work_keys_str_mv	AT marcosandregleizer spinozaonmetaphysicaldoubtandthecartesiancircle
_version_	1718398133778513920

Spinoza on Metaphysical Doubt and the “Cartesian Circle”

Ejemplares similares