Le emozioni come oggetti sociali. Intersoggettività e coscienza emotiva

The aim of this paper is to show the peculiar role that George Herbert Mead’s theory can play in understanding the social character of the emotions, with particular reference to the non-dualistic and anti-reductionist connotation of human conduct. The essay starts from two philosophical antecedents...

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Autor principal: Lorenzo Bruni
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Publicado: Firenze University Press 2021
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:901df05ae63641109584b093959650882021-11-17T09:32:16ZLe emozioni come oggetti sociali. Intersoggettività e coscienza emotiva10.36253/smp-132232038-3150https://doaj.org/article/901df05ae63641109584b093959650882021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oajournals.fupress.net/index.php/smp/article/view/13223https://doaj.org/toc/2038-3150The aim of this paper is to show the peculiar role that George Herbert Mead’s theory can play in understanding the social character of the emotions, with particular reference to the non-dualistic and anti-reductionist connotation of human conduct. The essay starts from two philosophical antecedents that exemplarily frame the relationship between emotions, intersubjectivity and normativity. These are the theoretical options of David Hume and Adam Smith. The hypothesis underlying this contribution is that the reflection on the link between emotions, intersubjectivity and normativity initiated by these two philosophers finds a more complete formulation in sociological terms in Mead’s theory. Through the overall argumentation developed in the essay, an attempt will be made to show that in Mead – unlike Hume and Smith – moral consciousness is not discontinuous with respect to emotional consciousness, but that both represent phases of the same social process. The social character of the emotions is thus defined by reference to a common fabric of intersubjective character that binds together emotional consciousness and the more articulated dimensions of consciousness as phases of the same dynamic of human conduct. Lorenzo BruniFirenze University PressarticleEmotionsintersubjectivityMeademotional consciousnesssocial actSociology (General)HM401-1281DEENESFRITSocietàMutamentoPolitica: Rivista Italiana di Sociologia, Vol 12, Iss 24 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language DE
EN
ES
FR
IT
topic Emotions
intersubjectivity
Mead
emotional consciousness
social act
Sociology (General)
HM401-1281
spellingShingle Emotions
intersubjectivity
Mead
emotional consciousness
social act
Sociology (General)
HM401-1281
Lorenzo Bruni
Le emozioni come oggetti sociali. Intersoggettività e coscienza emotiva
description The aim of this paper is to show the peculiar role that George Herbert Mead’s theory can play in understanding the social character of the emotions, with particular reference to the non-dualistic and anti-reductionist connotation of human conduct. The essay starts from two philosophical antecedents that exemplarily frame the relationship between emotions, intersubjectivity and normativity. These are the theoretical options of David Hume and Adam Smith. The hypothesis underlying this contribution is that the reflection on the link between emotions, intersubjectivity and normativity initiated by these two philosophers finds a more complete formulation in sociological terms in Mead’s theory. Through the overall argumentation developed in the essay, an attempt will be made to show that in Mead – unlike Hume and Smith – moral consciousness is not discontinuous with respect to emotional consciousness, but that both represent phases of the same social process. The social character of the emotions is thus defined by reference to a common fabric of intersubjective character that binds together emotional consciousness and the more articulated dimensions of consciousness as phases of the same dynamic of human conduct.
format article
author Lorenzo Bruni
author_facet Lorenzo Bruni
author_sort Lorenzo Bruni
title Le emozioni come oggetti sociali. Intersoggettività e coscienza emotiva
title_short Le emozioni come oggetti sociali. Intersoggettività e coscienza emotiva
title_full Le emozioni come oggetti sociali. Intersoggettività e coscienza emotiva
title_fullStr Le emozioni come oggetti sociali. Intersoggettività e coscienza emotiva
title_full_unstemmed Le emozioni come oggetti sociali. Intersoggettività e coscienza emotiva
title_sort le emozioni come oggetti sociali. intersoggettività e coscienza emotiva
publisher Firenze University Press
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/901df05ae63641109584b09395965088
work_keys_str_mv AT lorenzobruni leemozionicomeoggettisocialiintersoggettivitaecoscienzaemotiva
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